Patents sharing knowledge with papers: An empirical study on medical research when scholars turn into inventors by ROMITO, ELENA
  
  UNIVERSITA' DI PISA 
 
      Department of Economics and Management  
 




Patents sharing knowledge with papers: 
An empirical study on medical research when scholars 




       
 
SUPERVISOR:       CANDIDATE: 






              
Academic Year 2014/2015 
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Arianna Martinelli for her guidance, patience, support
and knowledge throughout this work. I am grateful to Giovanni Dosi for his




This work aims to investigate how patent strategies in the ﬁeld of medical
innovation can inﬂuence the long-run production of public knowledge (i.e.
ideas disclosed through open common institutions). In order to tackle this
issue, we identify pieces of knowledge disclosed thorough both papers and
patents and we estimate the eﬀect of the granting on the number of citations
to the paper. Since the patent grant comes with a lag of 3-4 years after the
paper publication, it is possible to see the grant as an exogenous shock for the
paper. We used the uspto database for data on patents and, speciﬁcally,
technological class 435/7.23 -which collects all patents referring to tumor cells
and cancer cells- constitutes the original set. Data about papers, instead, are
retrieved from the isi web of science. Our results show that the eﬀect of
granting property rights on basic research for cancer is on the type of authors
citing the publication (i.e. patents' inventors vs. third parties), rather that
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Introduction
Absolute certainty is not a feature characterising economics. What can be
obvious and sure for one, can turn into a paradox for another. However,
no schools of thought deny the central role of knowledge for progress and
economic growth. Hence, a discussion about the possible ways for spurring
innovative activities is highly relevant in economic theory.
Considering intellectual property rights (IPRs) as the ﬁrst mechanism to
stimulate research eﬀorts has been an idea widely accepted and rarely chal-
lenged. However, during the last three decades, more critical outlooks and
arguments have emerged. In particular, some authors1 have suggested that
when new knowledge is protected by a too strong monopoly (i.e. a very strict
patent system), it may cause a decline of the follow-on rate of innovation.
This may hamper the innovative process as this is very cumulative and the
past innovative steps are typically the main ingredients for the production of
new pieces of knowledge.
Although patents were born as a tool to remunerate eﬀorts conducted
by private institutions, nowadays these are widely used even in the public
sector. The Bayh-Dole Act -signed in 1980- is conventionally considered the
main policy change responsible for such a transition. In fact, it conferred to
publicly funded Universities and other public institutions the right to cover
with patents their discoveries. In this work we will deal with the concepts
of proprietary knowledge as opposite to public knowledge. The ﬁrst refers to
information disclosed in exchange of property rights (patents), the second,
instead, relates to ideas available in public platforms of disclosure (i.e. papers
published in scientiﬁc journal). With changes in the legal environment and
1See for example Heller and Eisenberg, (1998); Bessen and Meurer (2008)
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consequently shifts in patent practices, a clear distinction between subjects
involved in one sphere instead of the other becomes blurred. The traditional
linear model (Bush, 1945) that establishes a relation that goes from basic
research (originated in public institutions) to more marketable innovations
(due to the ﬁrms eﬀorts), is not suitable to describe a modern innovation
path.
A broad set of studies2 have considered the impact that public knowledge
has on proprietary knowledge3 recognising the fundamental importance that
the ﬁrst has on the latter. On the contrary, a scarce attention has been given
to the opposite relation. Among the few studies focusing on the eﬀect that
private tools of disclosure have on the rate of public knowledge, particularly
relevant is the Huang's and Murray's (2009) work. In that paper they found
out that the practice of patenting is strongly detrimental for future public
knowledge in the ﬁeld of genetics.
In this work, we are going to focus our attention on the ﬁeld of research
about tumor and cancer cells. The reason motivating this choice is twofold.
Firstly, themes dealing with medical and therapeutic conditions, assume a
relevance not only at the political and economic level, but these also bear
ethical implications. Secondly, processes of medical research are among those
ones that have mostly exploited the practice of covering with patents pieces
of knowledge classiﬁable as basic information, rather than applicable and
easily marketable.
The ﬁnal aim of this work is ﬁnding an answer to the following research
questions:
• In which way knowledge disclosed by both patents and publications
diﬀers from information disclosed only by means of private tools?
• Is the path of follow on knowledge inﬂuenced by the granting of a patent
associated to the same piece of knowledge?
2For a further discussion on this matter see for example Cockburn and Henderson
(1998); Cohen and Levinthal (1990)
3Note that in the literature the notion of private knowledge is often used as opposite
to the concept of public knowledge. However, we prefer to deﬁne the patented information
as proprietary knowledge since it is available for agents diﬀerent from patent's inventors.
On the contrary, private knowledge refers to secret and not disclosed information.
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The basic assumption that must be satisﬁed in order to deal with this
issues is that there exist some pieces of knowledge originally disclosed in
scientiﬁc papers and, later, covered by a patent (patent-paper-pair form of
disclosure4). In cases when it occurs, it is possible to isolate the eﬀect that
the patent grant has on the following life of the publication.
Work-plan
In order to achieve our ﬁnal aim we are going to articulate our work thorough
the following steps.
Chapter 1 presents a review of the main important theories that histor-
ically have aimed to outline the nature of technical progress. Besides the
classical Demand-pull and Technological-push theory we in depth describe
the features of an evolutionary theory where the procedural dimension of
technical knowledge is considered to be a cornerstone. Therefore, we will
argue that, when an evolutionary view is accepted, the set of mechanisms
able to guarantee returns for innovative activities is actually much broader
than the one considered in a classical framework.
Chapter 2 is going to investigate the features of the current U.S. patent
system outlining both historical and theoretical foundations of IPR regimes.
Later, we conduct an exhaustive review on the criticisms pointed out in
the literature. Beyond the theoretical argumentations we consider the main
empirical evidence either conﬁrming or denying those criticisms.
Chapter 3 will be focused on our speciﬁc sector of interest: medical in-
novation. After a brief explanation about the evolution of the industrial
structure, we will propose a review of the main features characterising the
innovative process carried out by both private and public institutions. The
ﬁrst ones typically invest in R&D aiming at the production of those inno-
vations closer to market. The second, instead, focus their attention on the
upstream level of research. Therefore, at the end of the chapter, we rely on
the existing literature for the sake of comprehension about the possible eﬀect
4The concept of disclosure by means of patent-paper-pairs has been introduced in Mur-
ray (2002) and it has been further implemented in the author's following work (See Huang
and Murray (2009))
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of patents when they are granted on basic medical research.
Chapter 4 explains the methodology we used to conduct our empirical
analysis and supplies the deﬁnitions of the entire set of variables adopted
in the case of study. Speciﬁcally, we dedicate a section to an in depth ex-
planation of patent-paper-pair approach giving a substantial importance to
the identiﬁcation strategy used to isolate pieces of knowledge simultaneously
disclosed by patents and papers. Later we describe the statistical tools we
applied for conducting both inferential and descriptive analysis.
Chapter 5 contains all the results we obtained at the end of our study.
In opposition with our original expectations, at a ﬁrst glance, we found no
evidence that the practice of patenting has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the amount
of following public knowledge. However, the unexpected results gave us the
right spur to deepen our analysis and it led to conclude that even though the
eﬀect on the rate of forward paper's citations (used as proxy for the rate of
follow-on public knowledge) is not clear, the nature of agents using the piece
of knowledge changes after the grant.
Finally, in the last part of our work we discuss the obtained results in
terms of policy implications and we propose some possible directions for
future research agenda.
Chapter 1
Innovation in evolutionary terms
The strict relation between economic growth and technical progress is evi-
dent and well recognised in economic thought1. However, the nature of this
relation and the causality rules are issues much more controversial. This
chapter will try to describe the debate on this matter justifying a preference
for an evolutionary view of the innovative process.
1.1 Why does Innovation occur?
The ﬁrst question that needs to be faced in order to describe the nature of
the technical progress is about what triggers innovative process. On this
matter, the two theories that have historically assumed a crucial importance
are the Demand-pull theory and the Technological-push theory, as recognised
in Dosi (1982).
Demand-pull theory
The basic idea besides this theoretical approach is that market forces are
the ﬁrst mover for inventive activity and technological progress. Rosenberg
and Mowery (1979) describe in detail the various steps that, according to a
marked-centred view, mark the path of the technological progress. The au-
1Dosi (1982), Technological paradigms and technological trajectories,p. 147
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thors conduct this analysis in response to a series of empirical studies2 that
seem to undoubtedly conﬁrm the centrality of markets force for spurring
innovation. Their critical conclusion, however, is that the proposition ac-
cording to which market demand governs the innovation process is by no
means conclusively demonstrated in these studies. Before pointing out the
possible causes behind this advocated invalidity, it is worth considering the
basic points supporting the theory. At a given time, there exists a set of
consumption and intermediate goods satisfying diﬀerent needs. Consumers
express their preferences about the features of the good they desire by means
of their pattern of demand. When the budget constraint relaxes (because
a growth in income), users' demand will grow more than proportionally for
those goods having relatively preferred characteristics. At this point, produc-
ers recognize the revealed needs of the consumer and the innovative process
begins as a response to such a need 3.
The criticisms that can be moved to such a strict and pure theory are
quite evident. The ﬁrst one emerges by the deﬁnition of need itself. It is
diﬃcult to accept, indeed, that agents are able to recognise their needs still
before than a solution for that need actually exists4. Moreover, even when
an ex-ante recognition is possible, needs are potentially inﬁnite and it makes
particularly hard to understand why a certain invention occurs in a speciﬁc
point of time, instead of another.
Beyond the ambiguous concept of need, also the idea of technology ap-
pears to be too versatile and responsive in this context, like if it was a freely
available blackbox (Dosi (1982), p. 150). In fact, even if it was possible to
assert the necessity of creating something that the market wants, it would
still be very diﬃcult to invent it without considerable eﬀorts and hight costs.
Despite these evident criticisms, the Demand-pull theory has been advocated
as the most reliable one for a long time and a quite supporting evidence has
2See for example Langrtsh J. (1972) and Meyers S. and Marquis D.G. (1969)
3This process has been well described in Dosi (1982), pag 149
4This statements is obviously not true for a set of primary needs that it would be
possible to recognise even without knowing a about a solution for them (think, for example
of eating, drinking or sleeping)
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been proposed5. One possible reason behind this apparent contradiction was
given by Rosenberg and Mowery (1979). In fact, they suggest that the the-
ory has been tested only in a scenario of successful innovation. The inventive
process, however is made of trials that can end in success, but, more often
these just reveal to be failures. The latter dimension is rarely consider in
pure-market-centred-models.
Technological-push theory
This second approach may be ﬁtted, somehow, at the antipodes of the pre-
vious one. Here, the innovative process does not depend in any way from
market requests, but, on the contrary, it would be consequent to some exoge-
nous factors determining technological changes. Among them the increasing
role of scientiﬁc inputs and the increased complexity of R&D activities are
the most relevant ones 6. The main consequence of considering progress in
science as the only responsible for a shift in the technological path is that
it becomes totally independent from the economic and social environment.
Moreover, this view considers only the a downward relationship that accounts
for the impact of pure science on applicable technology. However, these is a
non scarce set of cases where the opposite relation occurred7. Therefore,
although the importance of science for technological progress is undeniable,
a linear model that goes from the top to the bottom of the chain cannot be
established 8.
An alternative and evolutionary theory
The shortcomings of the previous theories leave the desire of ﬁnding an ap-
proach able to better understand the dynamic and complex nature of the
innovative process. Evolutionary economics explain that the main failure of
the traditional theories is the deﬁnition of technology itself. In a neoclassi-
5See for example Langrish (1972), Myers (1969)
6Dosi (1982), pag.151
7In XVII, the ship design case is a good example where the technological advantages
were mostly due to the actual experience rather than to theoretical science
8For further discussion, see Bush 1945
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cal framework technology may be deﬁned as a given set of factor combina-
tions, deﬁned (qualitatively and quantitatively) in relation to certain output.
It follows that the technological progress can be seen as a moving produc-
tion possibility curve and/or in terms of the increasing number of producible
goods9.
In an evolutionary view, these deﬁnitions are very far from being satisfy-
ing. The ﬁrst deﬁnition of evolutionary economics dates back to 1898 when
Veblen proposed the following interpretation of the economic theory:
A theory of a process of cultural growth as determined by the economic
interest, a theory of a cumulative sequence of economic institutions stated
in terms of the process itself.(Veblen (1898), pag.389)
It is clear that in a such broad view of the economic theory, also the
idea of technology has to be evaluated in wider terms. On this stream,
Dosi (1982) deﬁnes technology as a set of pieces of knowledge; both directly
practical and theoretical. Here the practical dimension relates to the devel-
opment as a process of problem-solving activity. Whereas, the theoretical
level is referred to the experience of the past attempts and to the knowledge
of the state of arts. Starting from this view of technology, the author estab-
lishes a powerful parallelism between science and technical process. Khun
(1962) introduced the concept of scientiﬁc paradigm deﬁned as an outlook
which deﬁnes relevant problems, a model and a pattern of inquiry10. Analo-
gously, Dosi outlines the deﬁnition of technological paradigm as a model and
a pattern of solutions of selected technological problems, based on selected
principles derived from natural science. Moreover, an additional comparison
has been made between the normal science and technological trajectories. As
the normal science is the actualization of a promise, the technological trajec-
tory has been described as the pattern of 'normal' problem solving activity
on the ground of a technological paradigm. In other words, a technologi-
cal paradigms identiﬁes the generic tasks, the material technology and the
available scientiﬁc proprieties (See 1.1). Once a paradigm has established,
9Dosi (1982), p. 151
10Khun (1962), pag. 23
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Figure 1.1: Technological paradigms and trajectories
Source: Dosi and Nelson 2010
diﬀerent possible technological trajectories can develop. At this point, in
order to answer the question Why does Innovation occur? is not enough
focusing on the various causes for shifting in the production function, but,
on the contrary, the idea of a mere functional link between inputs and out-
put is refused. The right question, in an evolutionary view, is Why do some
trajectories take the advantage on other possible ones? In order to give an
exhaustive answer neither reactions to markets requests, nor changes coming
from outside are features that, taken separately, have the power to explain
the development of technological process. At diﬀerent levels, indeed, both
endogenous and exogenous movers are fundamental for innovative activities.
Keeping in mind the parallelism science-technology, a chain that goes from
the pure science to market dimension can be imagined. The process of in-
novation, therefore, has to be analysed not only at the ﬁrm level (that is
actually only the lowest one), but it clearly begins in a more abstract dimen-
sion. At this early stage the economic interests of organizations involved in
R&D activities and the interest of public agencies are much more eﬀective
than market mechanisms which, therefore, loose their ex-ante power of selec-
tion. On this matter, the most explanatory example may be the computer
case in the II post-war when government institutions were the primary source
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of founds to be invested in R&D 11. Moreover, the discussion on the role that
public institutions play in the innovative activity leads to another important
aspect that has historically been central in the debate about the position
that single and heroic entrepreneurs perform in the technological process12.
If at the primary stage of breakthrough innovation, the importance of pub-
lic founding is hardly questionable, at a ﬁrm level Malerba and Orsenigo
(2000) distinguishes Schumpeter mark I from Schumpeter mark II models.
In the ﬁrst case innovation results from the fragmented eﬀorts of a myriad of
small enterprises, the latter are characterised by highly concentrated R&D
activities by few large and mostly public corporations. The prevalence of a
model on the other strictly depends on the nature of the industrial sector
13. The central features that determines the most applicable model is the
degree of cumulativeness in diﬀerent technological regimes. The property
of cumulativeness captures the degrees to which success breeds success, that
is the measure to which innovative advances are made by dwarfs standing
on the shoulders of past giants and it varies a lot across diﬀerent innovative
activities14. A process is much more cumulative as the knowledge involved
in it is endogenous. It is rather intuitive, at this point, that the higher the
degree of cumulativeness is, the harder the learning path becomes for those
outside the inventive sector. Therefore, in presence of an highly endogenous
learning process, Schumpeter mark II models will apply. On the contrary,
when learning is not easy, but at least possible, for entrants Schumpeter mark
I models are more likely to occur.
A part from the above discussed distinction, evolutionary economists
agree in admitting the importance of the economic and social environment
in shaping the long-run direction of the technological process. In fact, al-
though the idea of a black-box technology capable of instantaneously react
to changes in the demand is strongly refused, users' value and their requests
11For further information on the role of government institutions on innovation, see Free-
man and Soete (1997)
12The term heroic entrepreneur has been coined by Schumpeter (1934) and it refers to
those entrants that, thanks to their special skills bring new innovation into the market,
destructing the value of the old ones.
13See Dosi, Marsili, Orsenigo and Salvatore (1995)
14See Dosi and Nelson (2010), p.73
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cause an important inducement eﬀect15. The latter operates mostly through
two channels. Firstly, there can be an impact on the orientation of search as
described in Rosenberg (1976)16. Secondly, the eﬀect can be on the intensity
of search (rather than on its direction) in accordance with the Schmookler's
hypothesis (Schmookle, 1966).
Summing up, from an evolutionary standpoint the perception of the mech-
anisms behind inventive activity becomes much more articulated and not
easily explainable. As a consequence, it is impossible to re-conduct under a
unique set of factors the principal movers for innovation. The complexity of
the process is basically due to the nature of technology itself that is not seen
any more as a black-box but as a set of pieces of knowledge. However, the
latter is just a broad deﬁnition that can be better understood when other
interpretations are considered.
1.2 Alternative interpretations for technology
Dosi and Nelson (2010) identify four diﬀerent (but complementary) ways
to describe the concept of technology. In this section17, these will be brieﬂy
explained in order to underline the procedural dimension of technology, which
becomes the main feature for the analysis of the appropriability conditions.
Technology as information
The parallelism between technological knowledge and information can be
established on the bases of same shared characteristics: (i) non rivalry18 in use
(ii) indivisibility19 (iii) notional scale-free property. The latter is referred to
the property for which information stricto sensu has typically very low cost of
15See Dosi and Nelson (2010), p.75
16An example showing this eﬀect in practice are the experience of the resistance of
nineteenth-century English labour, to factory discipline. For further discussion on this
matter see Rosenberg (1976)
17Dosi and Nelson (2010), pp.56-63
18The use of one economic agent of a piece of knowledge, does not reduce the possibility
for another agent to use the same
19Note that in presence of non-divisible commodities, the basic neoclassical assumption
of convex consumers' consumption set drops (Mas-Colell, 1995).
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reproduction if compared with the hight generation costs. The implication is
that above a certain threshold, information can be used at any level (with no
depreciation) of production without incurring in the neo-classical limitation
of constant return to scale.
However, it has to be stressed that property (iii) holds for technological
knowledge only when it is considered in its pure sense, whereas, in reality, at
least two characteristics weaken the notional scale-free hypothesis. Firstly,
although it keep being true that the generation costs are much higher than
the reproduction costs, these are not negligible20. The cost of teaching is just
an example among them. Secondly, technological knowledge is characterized
by several degrees of tacitness. The concept is well expressed by Pavitt:
Most technology is speciﬁc, complex. . .[and] cumulative in its development.
. . It is speciﬁc to ﬁrms where most technological activity is carried out,
and it is speciﬁc to products and processes, since most of the expenditures is
not on research, but on development and production engineering, after
which knowledge is also accumulated through experience in production and
use on what has come to be known as 'learning by doing' and 'learning by
using. [...] The combination of activities reﬂects the essentially pragmatic
nature of most technological knowledge. Although a useful input, theory is
rarely suﬃciently robust to predict the performance of a technological
artefact under operating conditions and with a high enough degree of
certainty, to eliminate costly and time-consuming construction and testing
of prototype and pilot plant (Pavitt (1987), p.9).
Therefore, pre-existing knowledge necessary to apply any codiﬁed infor-
mation, implies non trivial costs to acquire the necessary capabilities for using
new technologies. The tacit components of new technological processes have
such a strong relevance, that even in those (few) cases when an Arrow core21
is present, the reproduction eﬀorts are still signiﬁcant. Moreover, the de-
gree of uncertainty about the ultimate success does not vanishes when the
20For a detailed discussion on this matter see Manﬁeld et al (1981)
21The Arrow core concept has been described in Winter and Szulanski (2002). Here the
authors deﬁne Arrow core as an informationally codiﬁed template
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know how component of the process takes the advantage on the written and
transferable part.
Technology as recipe
An other eﬀective way of describing technology is considering it as a sequence
of cognitive and physical acts that has to be performed in order to achieve
a ﬁnal product22, exactly as a recipe for a cake. Therefore, not only the
ingredients (inputs) must be speciﬁed, but also the entire set of procedures
that are necessary to get the ﬁnal output. This procedure-based view of
technical process in another important break point between evolutionary and
traditional theories. The second ones (over)use the production function as
a tool to quantitatively describe a process. However, the list of ingredients,
alone, is never enough to describe an output. Moreover, when the procedural
level is considered, one of the concept at the basis of the entire neo-classical
framework is challenged: the is the substitution eﬀect. Changing in the prices
of inputs, indeed, cannot imply an immediate rebalancing of their quantities
used in production, since variations in the ingredients, necessary require some
modiﬁcation in the procedural part of the recipe as well.
It is important to notice that, even considering technological knowledge as
recipes, the tacit component of the process still play a crucial role. Obviously,
the more a recipe is detailed, the more the ﬁnal result will be close to the
original one. However, your grandmother's cake will always be better than
yours.
Technology as routine
Often one single person is not able to put in practice what a recipe requires.
The various pieces of knowledge, indeed, are usually distributed across many
individuals. Therefore, diﬀerent people and group are assigned diﬀerent parts
of the process. This apparently trivial observation in actually introducing
another important dimension of technological progress still never mentioned
22See Dosi and Nelson (2010), pag. 59
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so far, i.e. the concept of social technology. It can be deﬁned as The system
of norms, belief and social practices shaping the way of doing things23.
The standpoint of technologies as routines considers simultaneously the
physical and the social levels of the process. Recipes alone, indeed, represent
only the series of legal procedures, that is to say procedures that are tech-
nically feasible. The division of labour and speciﬁc models of coordination,
instead, are part of a broader concept of technology which is well described
by the idea of routines. It worth noticing, at this point, that the introduction
of a new technique, not only has an impacts on inputs and on procedures,
but it often requires a change also in rutinezed path, it ,makes the scenario
even more complex.
Technology as atrifact
When the output of a recipe is an a physical complex good, the procedure-
centred description of technology becomes broadly complementary to an
artifact-centred view. In the second case, the ﬁnal artifact can be consid-
ered as the technology itself. In particular, it is possible to identify the ﬁnal
good with the technical process behind, by means of two diﬀerent approach.
Firstly, the identiﬁcation of the techno-economic characteristics of a speciﬁc
ﬁnal good. It allows for tracing an history of technology that, it has been
argued, shows an hedonic dimension of the innovation24.
Secondly, the diﬀerent components of the good and the necessary intermedi-
ate inputs can be separately analysed in order to describe the technical path
behind a speciﬁc artifact.
1.3 Means of appropriation
When considered together, the aforementioned notions of knowledge lead to
refuse the idea that knowledge can be considered as a pure common good. In
fact, although it keeps being non-rival in use, the predominance of the tacit,
23Nelson and Sampat (2001)
24Dosi and Nelson (2010), p. 62
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procedural and rutinized components makes the notional-free scale property
very weak in case of technological knowledge. The lack of homogeneous know-
how capabilities makes the imitation process much more expensive than the
one described in the traditional view. One of the main implication of such a
change in the theoretical perspective is on the feasible ways that an inventor
has to appropriate returns from its invention. The debate on this matter
would be unnecessary if we considered knowledge as an immediately and
freely reproducible good. In this situation the incentives to undertake an
expensive innovative process (that may end with a failure) would be very
scarce and limited in time. This is the reasoning justifying the broad usage
of strong regimes of patents in the classical standpoints. A deep discussion
about strengths and weakness of IPR systems will be the main topic of the
next chapter. However, at the time being, it is worth underlining that others
tools (beyond patents) can safeguard the inventor's remuneration when it is
recognised that knowledge is not a pure public good.





Lead time can have diﬀerent meanings depending on the contest. When
it referred to a possible mean of appropriability it can be deﬁned as being
ﬁrst to enter the market with a new product and/or being ahead of their rivals
(Laukkanen and Puumalainen, 2007). Carow et al. (2004) argue that ﬁrst
movers advantages are rare, valuable, non-imitable and non-substitutable
ﬁrstly because these lead to a technological leadership respect to peers.
The idea of secrecy as a tool for appropriating returns simply consists
of keeping secret an invention without disclosing it. The main beneﬁts of
using secrecy are, intuitively, the absence of fees and the potential no time
25See Choen, Nelson and Walsh (2000) and
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limitations. On the contrary, it may cause some duplicative innovations that
would not occur in case of disclosure.
Learning curves advantages are caused by an increase in learning by doing
that can lead to a superiority in technological knowledge (Arrow, 1962). In
fact, given the importance of the procedures in the innovative process, being
able to apply some tools can be even more important than the tool itself.
The relative weigh of one mean instead of an other cannot be assigned
without considering the most common mechanism of appropriation: patent.
Therefore, a deeper comparative analysis will be later carried out, after hav-
ing outline a variety of economic and historical features of IPRs regime.
However, at a very general level of discussion, it is possible to state that the
best mechanism is not univocally deﬁnable. On the contrary, the speciﬁc
peculiarities (degree of tacitness, cumulativness etc...) of diﬀerent sectors
play a crucial role.
Chapter 2
Features of the IPR system
Among the variety of mechanisms for appropriation, patents are the most
appreciated in the traditional view. Scholars supporting the necessity of
strong Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) regimes, indeed, see in the modern
deﬁnition of patents all the ingredients justifying the spread use of these tools
of protection. In fact, the United States Patent Oﬃce (USPTO) deﬁnes a
modern patent as
A legal instruments intended to encourage innovation by providing a limited
monopoly to the inventor (or their assignee) in return for the disclosure of
the invention1
The trade oﬀ between the loss of eﬃciency due to the monopoly provision
and the advantages deriving from knowledge disclosure is one of the main
argument animating the current debate on patent systems.
In this section we will analyse the general features characterizing the IPR
regimes. In particular, attention will be focused on the U.S. case since it
represents the largest and the strongest system in terms of norms protecting
intellectual innovation.
The aim is, ﬁrstly, to underline both historical and theoretical aspects
able to describe how the American patent system worked, works and should
work. Secondly, some criticisms linked to this structure will be mentioned.
1http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/intro.html Article 1, Section 8 of the United States
Constitution
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2.1 A brief history of the U.S. patent law
The History of patents began a lot of ages ago. It has been argued that some
forms of intellectual monopolies have been existed since the Roman Empire
era2. However, the ﬁrst form of an institutional patent system originated in
Italy. In 1474, indeed, the ﬁrst patent statute was issued in Venice. In this
document it is actually possible to identify the majority of the concepts that
are at the bases of the current IPR regime3. The statute introduces concepts
of novelty, registration of the new device, term of exclusive right as well as
the idea of infringement. In the next two centuries patents did spread across
Europe and only in 1790 the ﬁrst United Stated patent act (entitled An Act
to promote the progress of useful Arts) was promoted4.
In 17935 the act has been replaced by a more complete e detailed document
where, for the ﬁrst time in the history of patents, the deﬁnition of what con-
stitutes patentable subject appears. Moreover, another important feature of
the law was that one patent may have a dominating eﬀect over an other.
The possibility of an award of treble damages for patent infringement was
introduced in 1800. The entire XIX century has been characterized by both
frequent modiﬁcations of the law and important Court decisions that con-
tributed to shape the mechanism of the patent system itself. One of the main
important changes at a law level was introduced in 1836 with the introduction
of the Patent Oﬃce in order to ensure the novelty of the invention6. It was
recognised by the Oﬃce after having analysed the claims (never mentioned
before) proposed by the inventors. An other important article of the law in-
troduced the possibility of a seven year extension (on the thirteen originally
foreseen) of the protection. Simultaneously, the Supreme court introduced
the concept of non-obviousness with the Hotchkiss v. Greenwood case 7.
2See Devaiah (1992)
3Venetian Statute on Industrial Brevets, Venice (1474), Primary Sources on Copyright
(1450-1900), eds L. Bently & M. Kretschmer, www.copyrighthistory.org
4Copyright Act, Article 1, Section 8, clause 8, New York (1790), Primary Sources on
Copyright (1450-1900), eds L. Bently & M. Kretschmer, www.copyrighthistory.org
5Patent Act (1793)
6Patent Act (1836)
7Hotchkiss v. Greenwood; 52 U.S. 248 (1850), www.supreme.justia.com
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The two decades 1870s and 1880s have been characterized by the creation
of many international IPR organizations and by a gradual recognition of the
right of patenting to not American citizens.
This dynamic and rich wave of patent law incrementation partly stopped
in 1930s and 40s. These were the years of the Great Depression and of the
II Ward War and the supreme court did not appear to be very sympathetic
to patents. This aspect is evident, for example, in the Cuno Engineering
Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp8. Here the court established that to be
patentable an invention must reveal the ﬂash of creative genius, not merely
the skill of the calling.
After this period of lower consideration and appreciation for patents, the
era of IPR loving reforms began. The last two decades of the twentieth
century saw an increasing number of changes in the U.S. patent policy. The
major improvements that have to mentioned are at least four:
• The creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(CAFC). It has been created in 1982 and it is the result of a merge
between the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and
the United States Court of Claims. In practice, the CAFC institution
has been seen a strengthening of the intellectual law since it made easier
for patent holders to win legal suits9.
• The amendment of the Bayh-Dole Act10. It occurred in 1980 and
allowed to universities and other non-proﬁt institutions to get patents
from federally funded R&D. In this way, universities are encouraged
to collaborate with commercial concerns to promote the utilization of
inventions arising from federal funding.
• The expansion of the realm of patentability. By a shared decision
of the Patent Oﬃce and the CAFC the range of patentable subject has
been largely broadened in the past two decades. In particular, nowa-
8Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp 314 U.S. 84 (1941),
www.supreme.justia.com
9See Jaﬀe and Lerner (2004)
10P.L. 96-517, Patent and Trademark Act Amendments of 1980
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days it is possible to get property right on invention as genetically
engineered bacteria, genetically altered mice, gene sequences, surgical
methods, computer software, ﬁnancial product and method for con-
ducting auctions on the internet11.
• TheAgreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights (TRIPS). This is an international agreement reached
in 1994 and administrated by the Word Trade Organization (WTO).
The agreement establishes the minimum standards of protection to be
provided by each WTO member. In practice, this can be seen as an
attempt to increase harmonization of the international IPR law12.
These legal changes have been ascribed to play a crucial role for the explosion
of the numbers of patents registered after 1980. However, the evidence on
this matter is mixed at the best. The discussion of this issue will be tackled
in the next section of this work.
2.2 Theoretical framework
2.2.1 Incentive for innovation
The most common idea linked to the concept of patents is that these are a
necessary reward for inventive activities. Therefore, the implicit considera-
tion is that, in absence of intellectual property rights, there would be a lower
level of innovation.
Before trying to understand whether it is true or not, it is important
to underline that the starting point of this conventional view consists of
considering knowledge as a pure public good. If it was so, the ﬁrst and
immediate consequence would be that, with no patents, all the knowledge
produced by the inventor would be freely available and usable by anyone
11For an exhaustive discussion on this matter see Jaﬀe (2000)
12The impact of the TRIPS as been studied mostly with concern to the possible eﬀects on
developing countries. Although this work is not going to analyse this speciﬁc issue, there is
a wide set of literature dealing with this topic. See for example Cimoli et al(2014),Stiglitz
(2008) and Coriat et al.(2006)
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else. In this case, the strong positive externality to research becomes cause
of a market failure. According to the IPR supporters, a solution consists of
making knowledge partially excludable by means of patents; it is equivalent
to grant a (limited) monopoly.
The ﬁrst authors that formally modelled this intuition is Nordhaus (1969).
He explained the necessity of a trade-oﬀ between static and dynamic consid-
erations in designing patent policy; in other words, he brought to the light
the fact that if one wants to incentivize innovation by means of patents, it
cannot be done without a loss of eﬃciency.
The follow-on literature about this theme mostly focuses on how optimally
balancing the static costs and the dynamic beneﬁts.
However, it is important to notice that the described trade-oﬀ makes sense
only under the assumption that there actually exists a positive long run eﬀect
associated to patent granting. The latter is, indeed, an assumption and, then,
there is not a solid theoretical background supporting it. On the contrary,
by looking at the empirical data, the evidence on this relation is ambiguous
and sometimes negative, as we shall see in the next section.
2.2.2 Disclosure and diﬀusion
The importance of a patent as tool for disclosure can be understood when
an ex-post dimension in taken into consideration. While the previous argu-
mentations about the incentive to innovate has to be referred to an ex-ante
scenario, now it is necessary to focus attention on what happens after the
invention has been made.
In the traditional view, the inventor has only two possibilities: keeping the
invention secret risking the same discovery is done by another researcher or
disclosing it through a patent grant13.
In the latter case, both the inventor and the society would have a beneﬁt.
The ﬁrst in term of a right of exclusivity and the second in terms of disclosure
of knowledge.
Starting from this main consideration, other positive eﬀects are associated
13See Gallini (2001)
CHAPTER 2. FEATURES OF THE IPR SYSTEM 22
to the ex-post dimension of granting a patent. Firstly, disclosure could be
able to reduce the cost of duplicative R&D or, more generally, it would
diminish the double research eﬀort. Secondly, the disclosure of an idea could
be source for inspirations of other and new ideas. Finally , after the patent's
expiration, knowledge becomes freely available and it would mean a rapid
diﬀusion after 20 years.
Moreover, after the disclosure, the diﬀusion may come. The general rule
is that, following the patent grant, the owner has a total right of exclusivity
on the invention. However this is, luckily, not always the case. What leads
the IPR supporters to say that patents are good for diﬀusion is the fact that
it is possible to transfer the covered knowledge to others, mostly by means
of licenses. These confer the right to use the disclosed knowledge without
running the risk of incurring in legal suits. It has been argued that the
strength of patents plays a crucial role for the amount of given licenses. Here
the notion of strength has to be intended as the ease to defend the property
right (i.e. the stronger, the easier to defend in case of infringements).
Arora and Fosfuri (2000) showed that the practice of licensing in higher
in those industries where the level of eﬀective protection is higher. In this
sense, patents can be considered to be self-correcting: the stronger the right
to exclude others , the higher the incentive to give and ask for a license. How-
ever, despite the relevance of this ﬁnding, it does not imply that, in case of
a strong IPR system, technology will diﬀuse more rapidly. Under weak pro-
tection, indeed, disclosed inventions can diﬀuse easily through noninfringing
imitations 14.
2.3 Criticisms of IPR regimes
The entire previous section focused on the theoretical framework that has
been used in order to explain why a strong IPR regime reveals to be necessary
for spurring the innovative process. However, there is a set of alternative
possibilities that, if true, would lead to a totally diﬀerent conclusion. Here,
14For further discussion on this matter, see Gallini and Winter (1985)
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it is provided an explanation of the theoretical background behind these
diﬀerent views and a review of the main empirical evidences will be helpful
in understanding the likelihood for both of the streams.
2.3.1 An alternative standpoint
The nature of knowledge
The basic and unavoidable hypothesis behind the entire classical theory of
IPR regimes considers knowledge as a pure public good. Although the two
fundamental characteristics that make a good public (non-rivality and non-
exclusibility) well apply to the concept of knowledge, its tacit component
makes knowledge diﬃcult to be immediately replicated. Under this perspec-
tive, a world without a strong IPR system would not necessary mean absence
of appropriability. In fact, because of costs, time and personal capabilities
necessary for both duplication and learning, the inventor would be able to
appropriate some returns even with other mechanisms, alternative to the
one built on patents. The immediate and essential implication is that the
monopoly argumentations supporting IPR system loss part of their impor-
tance if the reduction of eﬃciency due to the monopoly cannot be considered
the only possibility.
Motivation vs external incentives
The trade-oﬀ between static costs and dynamic beneﬁts makes sense only in
case of real and strong existence of those beneﬁts. Since the positive eﬀect
is represented by the power given to patents of generating new knowledge,
there is, at this point, a natural question which needs to be answered: Is it
doubtless true that awareness of granting a property right spurs researchers
to innovate?
The most obvious objection that can be moved is that scientists used to
do research long before patents existed. This would be not fully justiﬁable
without introducing something more in the standard theory.
Murdock (2002) and Stern (2004) studied the role of intrinsic motivation.
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In particular, Stern exploited the fact that, prior to accepting a speciﬁc job,
many professionals receive multiple job oﬀers. Each job oﬀer is composed by
a wage and several characteristics. Among them of fundamental importance
is whether the employer either gives or not the possibility to keep being part
of the academic world, allowing for publications on scientiﬁc journals. He
conducted an experiment on a set PhD biologists facing diﬀerent job oﬀers.
There are two crucial conclusions deriving from his study. Firstly, as a general
trend it holds that the higher the level of freedom (in terms of possibilities
to be part of the scientiﬁc life) given to the researchers, the lower the wage.
Secondly, scientists often have a science taste; there are not isolated cases in
which they eventually decide to accept the least remunerative job to preserve
the possibility of having a research agenda.
This result should not come as a surprise when thinking about the reasons
why scientists used to do research long before patent existed. Motivations
that incentivize researchers have been the main topic of several studies in the
literature, sociological, more than economic (see for example Deci and Koest-
ner, 2001). There is a general consensus in stating that, not only personal
and intrinsic motivations play a crucial role in the innovative process, but a
system of external rewards may even show negative eﬀects on the amount
of eﬀort that people are willing to put in their studies 15. Now, it might be
thought this has little to do with the kind of research that is carried out by
those ﬁrms that invest in R&D and apply for patents. However, it has to
be stressed that technological innovation is highly dependent on a variety of
complementary institutions as universities and public agencies; these hardly
can be seen as structures where the pure markets incentives are the primary
push for innovation.
The fact that patents are not the ﬁrst determinant for the speed of tech-
nological progress seems to be conﬁrmed also from an empirical point of view.
Some speciﬁc examples on this matter will be later proposed. In general, it
has been observed the lack of a positive relation between the strength of the
intellectual protection and the rate of innovation 16.
15See Deci, Koestner and Ryan (2001)
16See Mazzoleni and Nelson (1998); Jaﬀe (2000); Granstrand (1999); Dosi, Marengo and
CHAPTER 2. FEATURES OF THE IPR SYSTEM 25
Knowledge is the main input for Knowledge
The intrinsic motivation and the strong personal interest represent only a
part of the more complex story behind this ambiguous relation. The other
(and perhaps the most important) aspects that have to be considered, are the
strong path dependence and the high level of cumulativeness characterizing
innovative and technological processes. The entire set of present inventions
would not exist without the past research progress, in which both successes
and failures have to be included. Therefore, the deeper the awareness about
previous research is, the higher the probability of reach a success today be-
comes. In such a scenario, it becomes reasonable to link the rate of innova-
tion to the level of available opportunities, instead of establishing a positive
connection with appropriability. In order to make the things clearer, it is
convenient to imagine an opportunity sea where incumbents and entrants go
ﬁshing for innovation 17. A broader sea contains more opportunities and
these mainly come from the search eﬀort undertaken in the past. In this
context, patents are actually seen as responsible for reducing the ﬂow of
knowledge present in the sea. Stiglitz (2013c) summarizes this concept stat-
ing that Tigher IPR regimes enable inventors to contribute less to the pool
(of opportunities), so that the size of the pool is diminished, so much so that
the actual level of innovation may be diminished.
While the rate of innovation can be metaphorically seen as the rate of ﬁshing,
the rate of success strictly depends on the ﬁrm-speciﬁc capabilities (Nelson
and Winter (1982); Dosi, Nelson and Winter (2000)). Within this capability-
based theory of the ﬁrms, it becomes evident that an increasing level of
appropriability can hardly have signiﬁcant eﬀects on opportunities and ca-
pabilities, which are among the most important determinants for innovation.
Pasquali (2006)
17See Cimoli, Dosi and Stiglitz (2009)
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The tragedy of anti-commons
Heller and Eisenberg (1998) stressed the idea that strong IPR systems, not
only are unable to increase the rate of innovation, but these would be also
dangerous for the entire technological progress. The authors point out the
concept of Tragedy of the anti-commons as a response to the classical notion
of Tragedy of the commons. The latter is referred to a situation where indi-
viduals, acting independently, use a public good seeking their own interests
behaving in a way that goes against the group interest. It can cause the de-
terioration of the common good due to its excessive utilization. The Tragedy
of the anti-commons proposed by Heller and Eisenberg, is exactly the oppo-
site. They argue that, when there are too many property rights on a good,
a phenomenon of under-utilization is very likely to occur. This would be
the case of knowledge when too many patent owners are present. The right
of someone will very plausibly impede to someone else of developing a new
innovation that needs the diﬀerent, but complementary piece of knowledge
covered by the patent. The extreme expression of this problem is represented
by the so called patent thicket, a situation where the property rights become
dense and overlapping. James Bessen has deeply analysed this topic during
his research activities. He argues that the probability of thickets is higher in
case of complex technologies developed in sector were the patent standards
are lower18. The patentability standards become a fundamental variable of
his model, where patenting itself is seen as economic activity. In fact, the
author considers the necessity of trading oﬀ the probability of winning a lit-
igation against the cost of patenting; the latter rises when the standards are
higher. Bessen concludes that when it is relatively easy to get a patent on
a component of a complex product, socially wasteful behaviours are stimu-
lated and the incentives to invest in R&D drastically diminish. Therefore,
the idea that stronger IPR systems imply a lower rate of innovation is sup-
ported also in this case; the argumentations that lead to this conclusion,
however, consider a strategic dimension (chosen by ﬁrms but stimulated by
strong patentability standards) which has never been mentioned so far.
18See Bessen (2003)
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About disclosure
The cumulativeness of the innovative and technological progress, makes the
role of disclosure given to patents of crucial importance. However, the eﬀec-
tive capability of patents in disclosing new useful knowledge has been rarely
debated in the literature. One of the few authors actively involved in this
topic is Fromer. In his paper (Fromer, 2008), the concern is about the uses
of disclosure for inventing around, improving upon and inspiring both during
and after the patent term. As a result, the author identiﬁes three points of
inadequacy in fulﬁlling the disclosure function that systematically and neg-
atively aﬀect the patent disclosure. The three identiﬁed weak-spots are the
following. Firstly, because of legal rules of the system, the patent document
is poorly structured and it does not contain some of the most important
technical information. This aspect incentives the inventor to under-divulge.
Secondly, the vast number of issued patents and the insuﬃcient attention to
indexing patents makes them hard to be found. Thirdly, a ﬂaw in the disclo-
sure failure is partly due to the behaviours of the readers. The current legal
system actually incentives not to read patent to avoid willful infringement.
In fact, a court has the authority to award up to treble damages to a patentee
when it ﬁnds an infringer to have acted willfully19.
Fromer (2008) proposed some modiﬁcations to the current IPR regulation
that, in his view would correct the above explained drawbacks. However,
when this kind of analysis is carried out in a broader scenario, the suspect
that, even with radical changes in the legal environment, some defects still
persist is more than plausible. The hight degree tacitness of knowledge, in-
deed, would hardly make possible to codify all the ingredients, even in case
of a perfect knowledge disclosure.
1935 U.S.C.  284 (2000); Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826 (Fed. Cir.
1992)
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Figure 2.1: Number of granted patents by USPTO, 1966:2014
Source: USPTO (2014)
2.3.2 Empirical evidence
From an empirical point of view the ﬁrst unquestionable evidence is that the
number of patents granted by the USPTO20 has rapidly and drastically grown
in the last 30 years. The speed of growth became particularly hight after
1980. The total number of patents granted in 2014 (300678) is almost ﬁve
times the number of patent granted in 1980 (61819). The rate of increase is,
on average, of 5,27% (See ﬁgure 2.1). The motivations for such an explosion
in the number of patents have been debated at length.
Korum and Lerner (1998) proposed four diﬀerent hypothesis theoretically
able to explain the patent boost. The friendly court hypothesis idealizes an
higher value associated to patent due to the creation of the CARF. The reg-
ulatory capture hypothesis, instead, sees the big American ﬁrms, reacting to
policy changes, as the responsible. Finally, according to the fertile technology
and the R&D productiveness hypotheses, the causes of the explosion would
respectively be either an higher rate of new technology or an increasing level
of applied research in the innovation processes. In a following stage, the au-
thors tested their hypotheses and they could not ﬁnd any empirical evidence
20Undated States Patent and Trademark Oﬃce
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that changes in the patent law were responsible for the patent bust. A fur-
ther support against the friendly court and the regulatory capture hypothesis
has been given in a survey by Choen et al.(2000). Here it is clariﬁed that
R&D managers did not perceive patents to be more eﬀective in the 1980s
than before. The alternative, largely shared, justiﬁcation which the authors
proposed, is linked with a change in the managers behaviours, who began to
use patent as the main strategic tool to block patents of competitors.
Patenting and Innovation
Besides the analyses of the causes for the exponential increasing in the
amount of patents, a number of researchers has attempted to test the con-
nection that occurs between patenting and innovation trying to determine
not only the existence of a relationship, but also the direction of causality,
which is surely an harder task.
Kanwar and Evanson (2003) used cross-country panel data on R&D/GDP
investment ratio, patent protection and other country-speciﬁc characteristics
spanning the period 1981-1995 to directly analyse the relationship between
innovation and IPR. In their analysis, the evidence unambiguously indicates
the signiﬁcance of intellectual property rights as incentive for spurring inno-
vation. However, since R&D/GDP is highly correlated with other aspects of
the development process, it is unclear whether the measured eﬀect of IPR
on R&D intensity is contaminated by causality running from stage of devel-
opment to strength of IPR21. The fact that Kanwar and Evanson (2003) are
actually omitting something in their model seems to be conﬁrmed by a set
of other empirical studies conducted both on historical and cross-sectional
data.
Moser (2005), in her seminal paper, introduces a dataset of almost ﬁfteen
thousand inventions at the Crystal Palace Word's Fair of 1851 and at the
Centennial Exhibition in 1876 to determine the eﬀect of IPR both on the
number and on the direction of innovations. Starting from the evidence that
diﬀerent countries have diﬀerent levels of eﬀectiveness (See Table 2.1)
21Cimoli et al. Intellectual Property Rights, p.94
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Table 2.1: Diﬀerences in patent law accross countries
Source:Moser (2005)
in patent protection, she found that patent laws shape the direction, but
not the rate of innovation. In particular, Moser (2005) argues that in coun-
tries with a lower level of protections, inventors tend to focus on a small set
of inventions where other legal instrument are more eﬀective than IPR. On
the other hand, in countries with a stronger patent law, the inventive activ-
ity appear to be more diversiﬁed. Lerner (2002) followed a similar approach,
analysing causes and eﬀects of diﬀerences in the strength of patent protection
across sixty countries and a 150-year period. He found the interesting result
that the rate of the innovation activity is not signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by vari-
ation in the IPR neither across countries nor in the length of the considered
period.
An other wide set of studies tackles the issue of the connection between
IPR and patenting focusing on diﬀerences across industries, rather then con-
sidering cross-countries and time-series data. Levin et al. (1987) conducted
this kind of analysis proposing, as a starting point, a questionnaire to a set
of high level R&D managers, each one involved in a diverse business. The
questionnaire concerned the notions of appopriability, technological oppor-
tunities and technological advantages. The collected data show that only
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in drugs and petroleum reﬁning industries, patents are seen as the most ef-
fective tool for appropriation. In all the other considered cases alternative
mechanisms are considered to be more eﬀective. As a consequence, they
have found that the impact of legal protection on innovation depends itself
on diﬀerent appropriability conditions which widely diﬀer across industries.
Therefore, a general upgrade of the IPR strength cannot be seen as the best
solution when it does not consider peculiarities of speciﬁc markets. Similar
results have been reached also in Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh (2000) where
patents are not reported to be the key means to appropriate returns from
innovations in most industries.
Moving at the lowest level of abstraction, a number of authors used data
referring to a speciﬁc industry in order to trace how the evolution of the in-
ventive process has been inﬂuenced by IP regimes. Hall and Ziedonis (2001),
for example, deeply discussed the U.S. semiconductor industry case. The
propensity of semiconductors ﬁrms to patent has dramatically risen starting
from the mid 1980s, but, at the same this sector is one of those that does
not consider patenting as the ﬁrst source of appropriability and incentives
for innovation. This patent paradox has been explained by the authors as
the result of a practice of patent portfolio races which became quite strong
in this sector. According to this view, the increased number of patents has
been more dangerous than beneﬁcial for semiconductors ﬁrms. Similar con-
clusions have been reached also for the software industry that has been at
length studied by Bessan and Maskin (2000). They argue that society and
even inventors themselves may be better oﬀ without the current strong pro-
tection. It is not a chance that both in Hall and Ziedonis (2001) and in
Bessan and Maskin (2000), the sectors of interest are characterized by inven-
tive processes which are particularly sequential and complementary.
An additional interesting study deals with the case of steam engines industry.
On this matter, Nuvolari (2004) and Boldrin et al.(2008) agree in stating that
the diﬀusion of patents on new engine's component delayed the invention of
more eﬃcient machineries.
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Beyond the tragedy of anti-commons: Troll in action
The problem of the under-utilization of commons factor in case of over pro-
tection has been only considered as a theoretical warring stressed by Heller
and Eisenberg (1998). However, Heller (1998), in his book, goes much further
than this. He reported a variety of examples, data and evidences showing
that the tragedy of anti-commons is actually much more than an hypothesis.
He explains that when too many people own one thing, whether a physical or
intellectual resource, cooperation breaks down and everyone looses. Among
the most interesting examples, the author reports the case of a group of
scientists who had found a potential treatment for Alzheimer's disease, but
they could not develop it for the market unless their company bought access
to dozens of patents. Any single patent owner could demand a huge payoﬀ;
some blocked the whole deal22. This example shares a common cause with
the wide set of other puzzles proposed by Heller: the over-fragmentation of
properties brings to a wasteful under-use of the good. It is worth noticing
that here there is neither a problem of appropriability nor a matter of hid-
den knowledge. On the contrary, the criticism is that, even though inventive
advantages have already been available, it become diﬃcult to commercial-
ize it since the costs of sharing (principally due to infringements and legal
suits) would be consistently higher than the beneﬁts deriving from the in-
vention. In the last years, the problem has reached its peak when ﬁrms have
begun to use anti-competitive practices made possible by a systematic fail-
ure in the current IPR regime. The most dangerous result of this behaviour
is, as already speciﬁed, the increasing patent thicket phenomenon. Also on
this matter a broad empirical evidence is available and it has been mostly
provided by Bessen and Meurer in their book
Figure 2.2 shows one of the most alarming evidence regarding the above
described phenomenon. Starting from the middle of 1990s, U.S.ﬁrms (dif-
ferent from Pharmaceuticals and chemicals) have seen an explosion in their
litigation costs that dramatically reduced their proﬁt. It directly brings the
22Heller, The Gridlock Economy: How Too Much Ownership Wrecks Markets, Stops
Innovation, and Costs Lives,NewYork: Basic Books, 2008, Preface
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Figure 2.2: Aggregate proﬁts from patents and aggregate litigation costs for
U.S. public ﬁrms (Pharmaceuticals and chemical ﬁrms excluded)
Source: Bessen and Meurer (2008)
authors to the strong and hardly debatable conclusion that, including the
risk of litigation, a number of industries (diﬀerent from chemical and phar-
maceuticals), would be better oﬀ if patents did not exist23.
Furthermore, the problem related with litigations costs lowering both
the degree of innovativeness ant ﬁrms' proﬁts, has been exacerbated by the
recent diﬀusion of the called patent trolls. Tucker (2013) deﬁnes them as
classes of patent owners who acquire patents from inventors but who do not
intend to provide products or services themselves. On they contrary, they
just use them as a legal tool to impede the works of others who cannot use
the invention disclosed in a patents without paying realities to the troll.
23Bessen and Meurer, Patent Failure:How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Inno-




Pharmaceutical industry has always been considered as an R&D intensive
and science-based industry where innovation is driven simultaneously by re-
search in scientiﬁc and applied knowledge. The interesting feature of this
industry is that starting from the mid-1970s, it underwent a paradigmatic
technical change1 that fundamentally changed the research process and dra-
matically modiﬁed the entire industrial structure.
At the beginning, pharmaceutical innovation was almost totally depen-
dent upon an oligopoly of large ﬁrms that were involved both in the in-
novative and in the commercial activity. Without going in depth through
the explanation of the industrial evolution, there is a general consensus in
stating that before the mid-1970s only a small number of ﬁrms entered the
pharmaceutical industry (Dosi and Mazzucato, 2006).
Since then, the emergence of small biotechnology ﬁrms became a growing
phenomenon. It has been argued that this change in the pharmaceutical
industrial structure can be associated to a shift in the paradigm underlying
research activity. In particular, Gambardella (1995) described two diﬀerent
technological paradigms dominating respectively before and after 1970.
In the ﬁrst period search activity was mostly based on random screening.
1See Gambardella (1995)
34
CHAPTER 3. PHARMACEUTICAL AND MEDICAL INNOVATION 35
In the second period, instead, research process became more guided and more
based on theoretical advantages in chemistry and molecular biology. A main
implication of the paradigmatic change is a shift in the technological regime
with an higher level of path dependency and cumulativeness of knowledge.
One of the most important consequences of the molecular revolution has
been the division of innovative labour (Arora and Gambardella, 1994). In
the new scenario, indeed, small biotechnology ﬁrms, publicly founded or-
ganizations and universities focus on upstream research where the level of
cumulativeness is much higher, while pharmaceutical ﬁrms, that are still
large and relatively few (Big-Pharma), cover that part of the process related
to the trials.
Therefore, when the aim is to consider potential eﬀects of any factor on
pharmaceutical industry, it is necessary to keep in mind the complementarity
between these two separated, but strictly interconnected, areas. Hence, the
ﬁrst section of this chapter will be dealing with issues referring to IPR in
big-pharma. Later, a discussion about patents granted to universities and
other public institutions will be carried out.
3.1 Innovation in Big-Pharma
Finding detailed data about costs for R&D spent by pharmaceutical ﬁrms is
not an easy task, because of their scarce propensity to share it. However, by
looking at some statistics conducted at the aggregate level, it is possible to
identify some trends in the sector that are, at the best, ambiguous.
First of all, it is worth noticing that, in case of pharmaceutical industry,
90% of the market is controlled by no more than 20 ﬁrms as shown in Figure
3.1. This evidence is perfectly in line with the premise that, even after the
aforementioned shift in paradigm, the structure of the market keeps being
characterized by a small number of big ﬁrms that make diﬃcult the entrance
for new ﬁrms.
The broadest set of data about the sector is available in the annual survey
reports yearly published by the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers
of America (PhRMA). This association does not represent the whole popula-
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Figure 3.1: Division of 2013 revenue across pharmaceutical ﬁrms
Source: Calcbench, Pharmaceuticals Industry Analysis
tion of the ﬁrms operating in the pharmaceutical sector, however its members
account for the 90% of total sales. Therefore, the data disclosed in the re-
ports are a good proxy for general trends occurring into the entire sector of
interest.
The most relevant aspect that has to be underlined is the high rate of
R&D expenditure on total sales. As shown in Figure 3.2 this has never
been lower than 15.5% during the last 20 years. Comparing the value to
the equivalent in other sectors, it reveals to be much above the average
(3.9%)2. Intuitively, it can be interpreted as a signal of innovativeness which
characterises the main pharmaceutical industries operating in the sector.
However, the output of the R&D investment is very far from being ho-
mogeneous (See Figures 3.4 and 3.5). What is unambiguous, instead, is that
the investment eﬀorts of pharmaceutical industries have been well remuner-
ated in the last decades3 . The other two factors that have to be considered
when trying to solve the PhRMA puzzle are (i)the growing number of patents
2See Nicholson (2012)
3Firmas belonging to PhRMA have a median proﬁt margin of 17%; a measure well
above the the other sectors' average which show a value of 3.1% (Pattison and Warren,
2002)
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Figure 3.2: R&D-Sales ratio for PhRMA
Source: Based on data from PhRMA 2015 annual report
associated with the FDA (Food and Drug Administration) approvals and, si-
multaneously,(ii) the above average proﬁts registered by the sector.
3.1.1 The heterogeneous quality of patents for drugs
Figure 3.3 shows the explosion in the amount of patents granted to pharma-
ceutical industries from 1995 to 2013. As already clariﬁed in section 2.3.2, it
is diﬃcult to associate an increase in the IPRs with an equivalent improve-
ment in the rate of innovativeness. However, the pharmaceutical case is a
peculiar one, since a clear classiﬁcation of approved drugs helps to identify
the length of the innovative step behind each grant. Speciﬁcally, the FDA
uses two diﬀerent criteria in order to categorize new drugs; one in terms of
chemical characteristics and the other in a view of therapeutic potential4.
The ﬁrst dimension is referred to the compounding forming the active ingre-
dient of the product which can be classiﬁed in one of the following classes:
• New molecular entities (NMEs) containing active ingredients never ap-
proved before.
4See www.fda.gov
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Figure 3.3: Number of patents in pharmaceutical sector
Source: ipstats.wipo.int
• Incrementally modiﬁed drugs (IMDs) sharing the same active ingredi-
ents with existing drugs, but that, thanks to some modiﬁcations, are
considered to be safer, more eﬀective or more convenient to use.
This diﬀerentiation clearly allows to distinguish between incremental and
true innovations.
When considering the therapeutic potential, instead, drugs can be in-
cluded by FDA in one of the following categories:
• Priority review if the drug can demonstrate even a moderate clinical
improvement.
• Standard review when the drug falls to demonstrate a clinical advan-
tage.
Thanks to the annual reviews annually published by the FDA it is possible
to have an exact measure of the number of new drugs approvals (NDAs)
recognised in a speciﬁc year. In the NDAs category are included all the
typologies of drugs, regardless of the features above mentioned. However,
the FDA reviews also furnish data about the product classiﬁcation both in
terms of chemical compounding and therapeutic potential.
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Figure 3.4: Share of NMEs on total NDSs
Source: FDA.gov
From 2008 to 2014, the FDA approved 677 NDAs. Of these, only 198
had a truly new component. The large majority (469), instead, had active
ingredients which were already available in a marketed product. Figure 3.4
shows the annual trend for the new drugs approvals by FDA and underlines
the portion of NMEs on the total since 2008 to 2014, highlighting the limited
relevance of NMEs.
Moreover, the linkage between the chemical nature and the therapeutic
importance of a drug does not have to be taken for granted. In other words,
the fact that a drug is innovative in terms of chemical characteristics does not
mean that it is also considered important for therapeutic purposes. Figure
3.5 puts in evidence how much of the approved NMEs has been assigned a
priority review.
Combining the previous observations, it can be stated that despite the
high number of drugs approved by the FDA between 2008 and 2014 (667),
less than a third are NMEs (30%) and only 13% of them are recognised to
have a priority review (See Figure 3.6).
This result, referring to the last seven years, seems to conﬁrm a big war-
ring often pointed out in the literature during the last decades: the limited
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Figure 3.5: Portion of priority on standard review for NMEs
Source: FDA.gov
Figure 3.6: Division of NDAs approved between 2008 and 2014
Source: FDA.gov
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innovative output of Big Pharma.
Angell (2004) deals with the problem of me-too drugs, deﬁned as those
ones that present only minor variations of highly proﬁtable pharmaceuti-
cals already on the markets. Speciﬁcally, she argues that 78% of the FDA
approvals recognised between 1998 and 2003 were actually nothing but the
outcome of little modiﬁcations of older ones. This estimation coincides with
the one proposed in Boldrin and Levine (2008), who argue that more than
77% of FDA approvals are redundant from the strictly medical point of view.
Several reasons can lead to the development of a me-too drug. First of all,
these can be used as a mean through which competitors can gain competitive
advantages in the markets. Second, the introduction of drugs only slightly
diﬀerent from other proﬁtable drugs (blockbuster 5) already available, results
in the possibility to extend the monopolistic right on older drugs (Angell
2004).
Apart from market reasons motivating the launch of me-too drugs, for
sure they are cheaper and less risky to develop. In fact, by deﬁnition these
drugs heavily rely on existing knowledge and competence. However, the IPR
regime works in the same way for every type of products regardless of their
quality characteristics. Whether a drug is merely replicative or particularly
innovative, in both cases a monopolistic right of 20 years is typically recog-
nised.
3.1.2 Proﬁts in Pharmaceutical industry
Although the claims of highly risky activity by pharmaceutical industries,
their proﬁts are, on average, higher than any other sector. Pattinson and
Warren (2002) estimated that the top 10 drugs companies in U.S. (all of
them belonging to PhRMA) have a median proﬁt margin of 17%. This fea-
ture appears to be particularly substantial when compared to the same value
registered in all the other industries present in the Fortune 500 list, that is (on
5Blockbuster drugs are deﬁned as those ones which lead an annual proﬁt of at least $1
billion of proﬁt to the company producing them.
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average) 3.1% 6. Such a deep diﬀerence must obviously ﬁnd an explanation in
the excessive diﬀerential between the cost of production and the drug prices.
In fact, granting monopolies on drugs, has a fundamental consequence on
product prices. The latter are not subject to any regulation and can be ﬁxed
at high level because of the strong IPR regime operating in pharmaceutical
sector. Apart from moral considerations on this matter, it would be inter-
esting to unfold the factors that allow the pharmaceutical ﬁrms to maintain
their above average rates of proﬁt. For doing it, all the aspects mentioned so
far have to be considered as fundamental pieces of a complex puzzle. First of
all, the peculiarity of high R&D expenditure characterizing the pharmaceu-
tical industry has been object of a number of studies which, somehow, tried
to identify the portion of expenditure really devoted to risky and uncertain
activities. Love (2003), for example, estimated that only the 2.6% of R&D
expenditure is actually devoted to priority review drugs. This aspect leads
to infer that the high portion of non-innovative drugs approved by FDA, is
the consequence of a strategic choice, rather than the eﬀect of failures linked
with a risky and costly innovative process. This evidence seems to contradict
an old campaign carried out by PhRMA to convince both public and policy
makers with the claim that the industry needs extraordinary proﬁts to fund
expensive, risky and innovative R&D. In the words of Holmer, the PhRMA
president:
Believe me, if we impose price controls on the pharmaceutical industry, and
if you reduce the R&D that this industry is able to provide, it's going to
harm my kids and it's going to harm those millions of other Americans who
have life-threatening conditions. (National Public Radio, Talk of the
Nation, Jan. 2, 2001)
Later, he reinforced the argument claiming that the cost of conducting
a single drug to the market, amounts to $500 millions. This estimation is
coherent with a study conducted by Di Masi, Hansen and Grabowski (2003)
6The estimation of this values is speciﬁcally referred to 2002. However, the observation
of higher proﬁts in case of pharmaceutical industries appears as a regularity persisting in
time.
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where the authors considered how each phase of the development process of a
drug contributes to increase the cost of production. In fact, the development
of new drugs is a multi-stage process. It begins with a preclinical phase7
and then it passes thorough three diﬀerent phases of testing on humans.
During Phase I, the drug is given to a small set of patients in order to
exclude the possibility of causing considerable side eﬀects. Lather, the drug
is administered to a broader set of people to test the eﬀectiveness of the
product. Lastly, during Phase III the treatment is tested on at least two
large samples of patients. Only at the end of these costly (but not R&D
intensive) steps, if the product has been recognised safe and eﬃcient enough,
the ﬁrm can apply for a FDA approval. According to the authors, the span
time necessary to reach the end of development process is, on average, 11.8
years and the rate of ﬁnal approval is equal to 12.5%. By considering these
aspects, and recognising that the costs of factors increase during the period,
Di Masi et al. concluded that the average cost per approved new drug is
$467 millions. This measure has been rounded up to $500 millions by the
industry (Manthien, 2003). Despite the relevance of this study the authors,
some criticisms8 have emerged highlighting the possibility that the cost may
actually be overestimated. The weakest point is surely linked with the type
of drugs considered in the study. Although the industry uses the proxy of
$500 millions as the price of any new approved drug, the products involved
in the Di Masi et al. seminal paper are all NMEs 9. Furthermore, the focus
is only on self-originating drugs, which are new entities developed by the
company as opposed to those they acquire from other research organizations.
These aspects, together with the observation that the percentage of R&D
expenditure devoted to NMEs is lower than 3%, imply that the $500 millions
measure plausibly overestimates the real cost of production.
7The preclinical phase can actually be divided in discovery and preclinical test costs.
Since the availability of data on this matter does not allow for disaggregating them, Di
Masi et al (2003) consider the two categories together labelling them preclinical costs
8See (Manthien, 2003)
9The category of drugs used by Di Masi et al. is, actually, slightly diﬀerent from
NMEs. In fact, the authors refer to new chemical entities (NCEs), instead of new molecular
entities. However this is a matter of notation rather than relevant from a substantial point
of view.
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All the discussion above leads to say that although the high rate of R&D
expenditure shown in case of pharmaceutical industry, a positive relation
with the degree of innovativeness can hardly be established. Moreover, the
claim that PhRMA needs extraordinary proﬁt for the development of expen-
sive and risky processes becomes less credible when a broader set of factors
is considered. Finally, although the strategic behaviour of investing in remu-
nerative, but low innovative activities intensiﬁes the problem of the absence
of controls on drug prices, the policy structure behind pharmaceutical in-
novation does not seem to aim at a solution. Speciﬁcally, one of the most
important tools which is essential for the industry proﬁt is represented by the
IPR system that, in the speciﬁc case of big-pharma, reveals to be essential
for approbriability, but not for innovation. One of the biggest danger linked
with such an high level of protection recognised for drugs (without distinc-
tion among the several categories) is that it risks to stimulate anti-innovative
activities. When a monopoly is recognised for both blockbuster and me-too
drugs, the choice of producing the latter becomes too easy not to be taken.
3.2 The upstream level of medical innovation
Although in the previous section the concept of self originating drugs has
been just mentioned, it actually deserves an high level of attention. In fact,
Nicholson (2012) proposes a very interesting analysis on the role that public
and other institutions play for the medical research process. Speciﬁcally, he
pointed out that R&D expenditures devoted to medical innovation in U.S.
shows a division in terms of sources of funding that can be summarised as
follows:
• Public institutions ﬁnance 37%10
• Pharmaceutical industry account for 34%
• Biotech ﬁrms cover 24% of the expenditure11
10The public institutions considered in this category are NIH, state and local govern-
ments and other federal institutions.
11the remaining 5% is ascribed to other foundations and private organizations.
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This division is one of the eﬀects of the so called Bio-tech revolution that
contributed to reshape the industrial structure after 1970. In fact, before the
aforementioned shift in paradigm, almost the totality of innovative labour
in medical ﬁeld was conducted by pharmaceutical ﬁrms. Nowadays, instead,
both the role of public and the diﬀusion of biotechnological ﬁrms have to be
considered in order to have a complete idea about the peculiar innovation
process in medical research.
3.2.1 Role of public in medical research
The ﬁrst general element that underlines the importance of public funding
for medical research deals with the high percentage (20%) of federal R&D
expenditures devoted to medical research. In opposition with the pharma-
ceutical trend, the majority of this funds are used in basic research rather
than in applied. In fact, Nicholson (2012) states that 55% of NIH ﬁnancing in
2003 targeted the upstream level of research and this proportion kept being
stable between 1994 and 2003 (Moses et al 2005). A number of studies have
analysed the issue of a possible relation between the NIH and pharmaceutical
innovations. Among them, Toole (2008) found out that a 10% increase in
NIH research is associated with a 6% increase in new molecular entities12.
Moreover, when a division between public and proprietary source of knowl-
edge is marked, some universities and laboratories must be included in the
ﬁrst category. Referring to medical research, their contribution for the most
innovative steps has rarely been objected. Cockburn and Handerson (1996),
basing their analysis on qualitative and quantitative data referring to a set of
drugs, found evidence of a signiﬁcant interaction between public and private
spheres of the medical innovative process. Mansﬁeld (1998) argues that 31%
of new drugs produced between 1986 and 1994 could not have been developed
without the fundamental research conducted by universities. Vallas et al.
(2011) reached a similar conclusion after having analysed a sample of ﬁfteen
blockbuster drugs developed in U.S. during 2006. They found out that only
12For additional studies on this matter see, for example, Toole (2007) and Blume-Kohout
(2009)
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two products belonging to the sample can be described as self-originating
drugs.
3.2.2 The Bio-Pharma revolution
A Bio-pharma ﬁrm is conventionally deﬁned as a small ﬁrm that conducts
discovery research and has been founded after 197013. In fact, consequently
to the shift of technological paradigm (described at the beginning of this
chapter), the search activity in the ﬁeld of medical innovation has largely
relied on the fast advantages in the ﬁelds of biotechnology and, especially,
of genetics. It led to a division of labour between rooted pharmaceutical
corporations and young biotech ﬁrms.
The changes occurred in the industrial structure in the '70s, has stimu-
lated the interest of a number of scholars. Many of them 14, focused on the
ﬁnancial characteristics of the new ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, they tried to identify
the main channels of funding operating for the industry. Despite the great
importance of the topic, is not the aim of this work to deal with themes con-
cerning the possible constrains that biothec ﬁrms have to face for ﬁnancing
their projects. In fact, for the sake of a complete comprehension about the
path of medical innovation, it is worth considering the features of the innova-
tive activities conducted by the ﬁrms, rather than their budget problems. Dosi
and Mazzucato (2006) argue that small dedicated biotechnology ﬁrms typ-
ically concentrate on upstream research developing initial drug compounds
later bought by big pharmaceutical industries. This aspect further strength-
ens the idea that the portion of NMEs developed inside pharmaceutical ﬁrms
after a risky and a long innovation process is actually very low.
3.2.3 Monopoly rights in basic research
In order to study the possible eﬀects of IPR at the upstream level of medical
research, two main factors have to be considered. Firstly, the Bayh-Dole
13See Nicholson (2012)
14For further discussion on this topic, see Metrick and Nicholson (2009) and Guedj and
Scharfstein (2004).
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act (1980), which allowed to publicly founded universities and public labs
to cover with patents their inventions, signed one of the most important
policy changes for the basic research dynamics. Secondly, the ﬁeld of research
mostly exploited by both publicly founded institutions operating in medical
research and small biotech ﬁrms is, doubtless, human genetics. Therefore,
the debate over public and private contributions to genetic knowledge fuelled
by the rapid sequencing of the human genome, the burgeoning stream of
public genetic knowledge published in scientiﬁc articles and the expansion
of gene patenting by industry  exempliﬁes broader arguments over whether
patenting helps or hinders public knowledge (Huang and Murray (2009), p.3).
In accordance with other scholars, Greenﬁeld (2006) argues that patenting
on genetic material is creating numerous limitations to scientiﬁc process in
the area of medical research. The practice of patenting both full genes and
small part of DNA sequences, is increasing gene test price, initiating costly
patent wars between ﬁrms and universities. On the contrary, Walsh et al.
(2005) argue that intellectual properties have actually no eﬀect on public
knowledge of genetic.
In order to ﬁnd a clear answer to the role on monopoly rights in genetic
research, several studies have tackle the problem focusing on single cases of
litigations and infringements. Merz and Cho (2005) state that among the
wide variety of patents protecting genetics knowledge, important ones are
those referring to all known methods to test disease. The most famous gene
patents dealing with this issue are those implicated in breast and ovarian can-
cer (BRCA1 and BRCA2) and those referring to the test of the Alzheimer's
disease (Apo-E). The problematic aspect related to this kind of patents is
that the genes causing the disease can be multiple and leading to the possi-
bility of having a patent thicket of claims overlapping in the genetic territory.
This is the case, for example, of patents on BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, which
are at least twelve only in the Undated States. Furthermore, the same gene
can be used to test diﬀerent prognostic purposes, as in the case of Apo-E
test. Although the majority of gene patents owners tend to be rather ﬂexible
in enforce their exclusivity against clinical laboratories, the latter report to
have had at least one gene patent asserted against them (Cho et al. 2003).
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Typically, clinical and research laboratories pay royalties for using patented
technologies. However, as observed in Merz and Cho (2005), in a rather
small number of cases patent owners even refuse to grant licenses preventing
to use the knowledge about a certain gene in disease's testing. The case of
Myiad Genetics, which owns BRCA1 invention, is exemplar for this matter.
In fact, Myriad Genetics has been recently involved in a legal battle where
the Association for Molecular Pathology accused the company to held prop-
erty rights on genes that naturally occur on every human and to obstruct the
fundamental research on ovarian cancer. The Supreme Court conﬁrmed this
idea declaring that A naturally occurring DNA segment is a product of nature
and not patent eligible merely because it has been isolated15 and invalidating
two Myriad Genetics' gene patents.
Although these speciﬁc examples well describe the challenges of patents
on genes, they represent only few cases that can be treated almost anec-
dotally. In order to develop a large scale study on the interaction between
proprietary and public knowledge, instead, Murray (2002), proposes an in-
novative methodology, based on the construction of patent-paper-pairs, that
allows for the identiﬁcation of pieces of knowledge simultaneously disclosed
by papers and patents. Since we ﬁnd particularly powerful this strategy,
we decided to rely mostly on Murray's work to conduct our analysis on the
potential eﬀect of IPR regimes on the highest level of medical research, There-
fore, a deep discussion about patent-paper-pairs approach will be carried out
in the remaining part of this work.
15Supreme court,.No. 12398, June 13, 2013
Chapter 4
Data & Method
The aim of this work is to investigate the interactions between public and
private tools of knowledge disclosure. In particular, our ambition is ﬁnding
concrete pieces of knowledge that, in diﬀerent periods of time, have been
disclosed both by means of patents and publications. To achieve the goal, we
followed a procedure based on Murray's (2002) seminal work, that introduces
an innovative approach, based on the construction of patent-paper-pairs, able
to identify those touching-points between public and private spheres of knowl-
edge. We think this is the best procedure to give an answer to our main
research questions, which are:
• In which way knowledge disclosed by both patents and publications
diﬀers from information disclosed only by means of private tools?
• Is the path of follow on knowledge inﬂuenced by the granting of a patent
associated to the same piece of knowledge?
4.1 Patent-paper-pairs
A patent-paper-pair can be deﬁned as a set of two documents -a patent and
a scientiﬁc publication- that, despite being subject to diﬀerent institutional
contexts, share exactly the same content. In particular, patents refer to a
proprietary dimension of knowledge, whereas papers published in scientiﬁc
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journals contribute to increment the so called stream of public knowledge.
Following Murray (2002), in order identify a pair the patent and the paper
must show a correspondence between authors, publication dates and con-
tents. The starting point for the couples' identiﬁcation process can be either
a set of papers (Murray, 2002) or a set of patents (Huang and Murray, 2008)
depending on the aim that the researcher wants to achieve.
Since we want to focus our a attention on the speciﬁc case of innova-
tion about cancer and tumors, we decided to use a set of patents, explicitly
referring to this matter, as starting point for our analysis.
Data about patents have been taken from the uspto full database
available on the internet1. It contains all the patents issued by the United
States Patent and Trademark Oﬃce (uspto) since 1976 and it allows to re-
trieve the data using diﬀerent criteria such as: assignees, applications, dates
etc. For this work, we found particularly useful to search the initial patents
set using the ﬁeld current U.S. classiﬁcation containing the technological
class to which the patent is assigned. The one we considered is the number
435/7.23, which contains, according to the uspto declaration, all the inven-
tions concerning tumor cells or cancer cells. The class includes 2282 patents
that have been granted in the last 39 years. Our analysis, however, focuses
on 761 patents granted between 2004 and 2011. This 761 patents constitute
our initial set.
In order to identify which patents of the initial set constitute a pair, we
used the isi web of science database2 which contains all data we need
about scientiﬁc publications. It is worth noticing that, although the uspto
full database and the isi web of science contain very detailed infor-
mation respectively about patents and papers, these are totally independent
one from the other. Therefore, the construction of the pairs has been based
on a manual matching repeated for each one of the 761 patents contained
inside the original set.
The ﬁrst step of the identiﬁcation process is related to the people involved
in the inventive process. In fact, at the initial stage, we checked for each
1www.uspto.gov
2The full patent database is available on apps.webofknowledge.com
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patent, whether its inventors appear also as authors of some peer reviewed
articles3 contained in the isi web of science. We used a rather restrictive
deﬁnition according to which all the inventors have to be listed among the
authors4.
In cases where the author matching condition was satisﬁed, we proceeded
to compare the patent application date and the publication date, requiring
that they do not diﬀer for more than two years. In some cases, however,
we found that, despite a considerable temporal dispersion, patents exactly
retrace the content of certain papers. In exploring the causes of such appar-
ent contradiction, we recognised a correspondence between the priority date
(rather than the application date) and the publication date. This scenario is
particularly frequent for patents with non-american inventors that apply for a
patent in a diﬀerent country claiming, simultaneously, a priority in USA. The
result is that, although the uspto database only shows the date in which
the document was ﬁlled in U.S., it is actually referred to a piece of knowledge
already opened in another application made in a diﬀerent state. Therefore,
we decided to consider suitable for the date-matching-requirement also those
patents that show a link between the priority date and the publication date5.
The last condition for the construction of a patent-paper-pair, relates to
the treated topic. In particular, we checked that the patent abstract matched
the paper abstract. It is worth noticing that, because of a lack in speciﬁc
biological and biomedical knowledge, the abstract matching condition has
been tested mostly through a keyword searching activity.
From the initial set of 761 patents, we were able to ﬁnd, at the end of
the matching process, 202 documents that undoubtedly contain pieces of
3These refer to those articles that have been submitted to a process used for checking the
work performed by one's equals (peers) to ensure it meets speciﬁc criteria. The evaluation
is, therefore, made by scientiﬁc, academic or professional team operating in the same ﬁeld
of the author.
4Note that the following relation does not hold. In other words, the paper's authors
can be more than the patent's inventors
5To give a clear example of this situation, patent number 6,756,201 can be taken
into consideration. On the uspto, it appears that its application date is February 2001,
however, by conducting a deeper research (on google patents), we found out there was
a priority date on this document dating back to 1995. Therefore it is worth associating it
with a paper published much earlier than 2001.
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Figure 4.1: Patent: number 7,094,868
Source: patft.uspto.gov
knowledge previously disclosed in a scientiﬁc journal. These 202 couples
of patents and publications constitute the set of paired-patents studied
in this work. The remaining 559 patents not associated with a publication
constitute the a set of (no-paired-patents). Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.1
give a clear example of a patent-paper pair that perfectly satisﬁes the three
criteria above described.
Beyond the uspto full database and the isi web of science we col-
lected data about patent characteristics from the epo-patstat database(April,
2014 version) and the oecd quality database.
4.2 Method
In order to address our research questions we are going to use both descriptive
and inferential statistics. First of all, we are going to analyse and compare
several characteristics of the paired patents and no-paired patents,
considering them as two independent populations. The comparison cannot
takes advantage of the classical statistical tools applicable in case of variables
normally distributed. Speciﬁcally, the standard t-test on mean diﬀerences
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Figure 4.2: Paper: WOS:000186534300006
Source: apps.webofknowledge.com
between two populations is not applicable to our variables of interest, because
of their skewed distribution. This aspect leads to the necessity of using
an alternative framework that is simultaneously able to consider the non-
normality of the entire set of variables and the heterogeneity shown by their
distributions. For this reason, we opted for performing a Mann-Whitney
test on median diﬀerences. This is a non-parametric test that compares the
medians from two populations and it works for both continuous and discrete-
count variables; as in our cases.
Second, we set up an econometric model able to isolate the eﬀect of the
patent granting on the rate of follow-on public knowledge. Here, the dataset
is constituted by the 202 patent-paper-pairs resulting at the end of the iden-
tiﬁcation process. As a proxy for the rate of follow-on public knowledge, we
are going to use the citations that the paper receives after its publication
by other peer-reviewed articles 6. In particular, the main dependent variable
is the amount of citations obtained by each publication on an annual base.
The observation period goes from the paper publication year until the end
6This approach has been widely use in the literature. See, for example, de Solla Price
(1965); Hall, Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg (2001); Posner (2000)
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Figure 4.3: Scheme of the patent-paper-pair identiﬁcation strategy
of 2014. The choice to truncate the count at this date has been done in
order to have a complete information about each year. Since the 202 papers
(obviously) have not been published all in the same year, we observe articles
for periods with diﬀerent lengths. Hence, the result is an unbalanced panel
where the time of observation varies together with the age that every publi-
cation have reached at the end of 2014. In this structure, the ﬁnal number
of observations for the 202 publications is equal to 2536.
The biunivocal relation that we established between each patent and each
paper contained in our dataset, allows for considering the grant of the patent
as an exogenous shock in the paper's life. In fact, the granting occurs (on
average) with a lag of 4.5 years after the application date. Since we construct
the pairs requiring a correspondence between the patent's application date
and the paper's publication period, roughly the same lag in time is shown
also between the publication and the granting date. The presence of a shock,
allows for the adoption of a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach where the cita-
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tions belonging to the pre-grant period represent the control group and the
others form the treatment group. In order to formally distinguish the two
sets, we are going to associate a binary variable to each observation assum-
ing value equal to 1 if the year is in the post-grant period and 0 otherwise.
Figure 4.3 supplies a graphical representation of the scheme we adopted to
apply our model.
Recalling that our ﬁrst aim is to identify the eﬀect of a shifting in the
IPR regime on the rate of follow-on public knowledge, we consider the an-
nual number of citations received by each paper as dependent variable of
our diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence model. Since this is a discrete counting variable
highly right-skewed distributed (see Figure: 4.4), we have to consider the
proper model ﬁtting these characteristics and able to avoid heteroskedastic-
ity.
Figure 4.4: Distribution of annual citations
Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984) in their seminal paper state that
there are two main regression models that may be used to deal with dis-
crete count variable: (i) The Poisson regression model (PRM) and the (ii)
The Negative Binomial regression model (NBRM). In order to choose the
most ﬁtting to our case, we need to compute the conditional mean and the
conditional variance of the number of annual citations. In case the two are
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not diﬀerent, we can apply the Poisson regression method. However, our
computations suggest that the mean and the variance assume respectively
values of 12.24 and 410.89. The diﬀerence is clear and the over-dispersion is
undeniable. This observation leads to the impossibility to apply the PRM
to our case. Therefore, we opted for using the NBRM as the model able to
better describe the characteristics of our dependent variable.
The estimation have been run using the pglm() command present in the
pglm library available in the R-software.
4.3 Variables
In this section of the work we are going to describe all the variables that
will be used in both the descriptive and regression analyses. In order to be
clear as much as possible, we are going to gather them in four diﬀerent sets,
which are: (i) the dependent variable of the regression analysis (ii) Variables
of interest (iii) paper variables and (iv) patent variables (See Table 4.1).
Dependent variable: Here we include the most important variable of
the model represented by the number of annual citations (ANNUAL_CITS )
received by each one of the papers involved in a pair. Given the unbalanced
structure of the panel, the total number of observations is 2536, that is the
sum of the ages of each publications. That is to say the number of years
elapsed between the publication of the paper and 2014
Variables of interest: This set contains the two main explanatory vari-
ables of our model.
PAT_IN_FOR is a dummy which assumes value 0 in the years before the
granting and value 1 in all the after-patent-grant years. This variable is the
one that allows for dividing citations belonging to the control group from the
ones ﬁlling up the treatment-group. Therefore, in the results' interpretation
coeﬃcient referring to this dummy deserves the highest level of importance.
PATENT_WINDOW is an other binary variable which assumes value equal
to 1 only during the patent granting year. We retain it plays an important
role for the explanation of the immediate eﬀect caused by a shift in the IPR
regime. These two variables can also be deﬁned as pairs variables because
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these are the only ones simultaneously referring to both patents and papers
Paper variables: Here we include a list of variables able to capture
some publications' characteristics which will be used as control variables of
our model.
PUB_YEAR is the year during which the paper has been published in the
peer-reviewed scientiﬁc journal.
N_OF_AUTHORS and N_OF_ADDRESSES respectively count the num-
ber of authors and the number of addresses appearing in a paper. While
the ﬁrst one gives information about the division of eﬀorts behind an article,
the second measures the number of diﬀerent organizations involved in the
production of the piece of knowledge disclosed through the paper.
PUB_ADDR and PRIV_ADDR are two binary variables that reﬂect the na-
ture of the addresses' characteristics. Speciﬁcally, they assume value equal to
1 when at least one address is either public or private respectively. Among
public institutions we consider universities, government organizations and
laboratories7.
IMP_FACTOR is a measure for ranking, evaluating, categorizing, and com-
paring journals8 yearly computed by ISI web of science. The impact factor is
deﬁned as the number of current year citations divided by the source items
published in that journal during the previous two years. In this work we will
use not the current, but the 2014 impact factor as a proxy for the quality of
the journal. This choice is coherent with our decision to drop the observations
at the end of the same year.
Patent-variables: Here we introduce a list of indicators available on the
oecd-quality database or calculated from patstat database describ-
ing the patents' most important characteristics. Diﬀerently from the other
variables described so far, these ones are calculated on the original set of
761 units rather than only on the dataset of paired patents used for our
regression. It is worth noticing, that the utility of patent-variables is double:
on one hand, we are going to use some of them for the comparison between
7The source we used to establish whether an address was public or not is the e-mail
addresses, usually present in the paper.
8www.wokinfo.com
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paired and no-paired patents, on the other hand, these will be useful to
add further speciﬁcations to our regression.
GRANT_YEAR: It is the year in which the uspto recognises to the appli-
cant the right of exclusivity for an invention granting a patent on it.
PATENT_SCOPE : It is associated with the technological and economic
value of a patent. Lerner (1994) proposes a deﬁnition of patent scope based
on the number of distinct 4-digit subclasses of the International Patent Clas-
siﬁcation (IPC). Each patent, indeed, is also classiﬁed according to an in-
ternational classiﬁcation reﬂecting diﬀerent areas of technology9. Since each
patent lists the international classes that have been assigned to, it become
feasible to compute the patent scope.
PATENT_SCOPEp = np
where np is the number of IP classes listed in the patent. It has been ar-
gued that, the broader the scope index, the higher potential technological
and market value of a patent10.
FAMILY_SIZE : It represents the number of diﬀerent patent oﬃces where a
given innovation has been registered
INV_TEAM_SIZE : The inventive time size indicates the number of patent's
inventors. It is worth noticing that, for each patent, this is nothing but a
subset of the papers' authors category. One of the three fundamental require-
ments for setting up a patent-paper-pair was, indeed, that all the inventors
of the patents must appear as authors of the paper.
BWD_CITS : Backward citations refer to the list of patents, scientiﬁc works
and other source of knowledge cited by a patent. Once an applicant has fur-
nished this list, all the contained references are analysed by patent examiners
who decide whether to keep or delete the citation. Criscuolo and Verspagen
(2008) argue that the numbers of backwards citations is positively related
with the novelty of a patent.
NPL_CITS : Citations of non-patent literature represent the list of refer-
9The IPC classiﬁcation is available www.wipo.int
10Squicciarini, Dernis and Criscuolo (2013), p. 10
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ences, diﬀerent from patents, that have been cited. Diﬀerently from the
backwards citations, the number of NPL_CITS has been interpreted as a
good indicator not for novelty, but for the quality of the patent11. Moreover,
the level of non patented literature citations reﬂects the contribution of pub-
lic knowledge to a given invention 12.
NUM_OF_CLAIMS : The number and content of the claims determine the
breadth of the rights conferred by a patent (OECD, 2009) and its expected
value. In fact, patent fees are generally based on the amount of claims con-
tained in the documents (the more the claims the higher the fees); therefore
the patent's expected market value has to be related with the number of
claims 13.
FWD_CITS5 and FWD_CITS7 : Forward citations refer to the citations
that a patent receives once being granted. Their number gives important
information about the relevance that a patented invention has for the devel-
opment of follow-on technologies. Since the measurement of forward citations
can typically be done on two bases -i.e. ﬁve or seven years after the publica-
tion date- we describe two separate indicators for the two cases .
GENERALITY : The generality index relies on information concerning simul-
taneously forward citation and international classes (at every level of digit).













X= focal paper with Yi=1,....N citing papers
T ni = Total number of international classes (IPC) at the n-digit present in yi
T nij = Total number of IPC n-digit classes in the j
th IPC 4-digit classes in yi
j = 1...Mi is the cardinal of all IPC 4-digits classes in yi
When the value of the index is close to 1, it means that the citing patents
11See Branstetter (2005)
12See Narin et al.(1997)
13See Tong and Davidson (1994)
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belongs to a variety of diﬀerent classes; meaning that the patent has a rather
broad impact. On the contrary, a low level of GENERALITY indicates that
the patents that cites the x are concentrated in few ﬁelds of technologies.
ORIGINALITY : Patent originality refers to the breadth of the technology
ﬁelds on which a patent relies14. The logic to build the indicator is quite
similar to the one used to set up the generality index. However, now the
focus in on the backward- rather than the forward- citations. Analytically,





Where spj is the percentage of citations made by patentX to technological
class j out of the the total nx patent classes. The rationality of this indicator
is that the wider is the knowledge, the larger is the potential for originality.
As in the generality index case, also the originality index is deﬁned between
0 and 1.
Table 4.1 furnishes a scheme useful to clarify the variables distinction and
deﬁnitions.
14Squicciarini, Dernis and Criscuolo (2013), pag. 49
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Count of citations yearly recived by the focal




Dummy assuming value 1 if the citation is
recived in the post-grant period
USPTO
PATENT_WINDOW
Dummy assuming value 1 if the citation is
recived in the year of grant
USPTO
Papers variables
PUB_YEAR Year of publication in the journal ISI
N_OF_AUTHORS Number of authors of the article ISI
N_OF_ADDRESSES
Number of institutions involved in
the publication
ISI
PUB_ADDR Dummy set to 1 if at least 1 address is public ISI
PRIV _ADDR Dummy set to 1 if at least 1 address is private ISI
IMP_FACTOR Imact factor of the journal ISI
Patents variables
GRANT_YEAR: Year in which the patent is granted USPTO
PATENT_SCOPE Number of international classes in the patent OECD
FAMILY _SIZE: Number of patent oﬃces OECD
INV _TEAM_SIZE Number of inventors PATSTAT
BWD_CITS Number of citations made by a patent OECD
NPL_CITS Citations of non patented literature OECD
N_OF_CLAIMS Number of listed claims OECD
FWD_CITS5 Citations recived in 5 years after the grant PATSTAT
FWD_CITS7 Citations recived in 7 years after the grant OECD
GENERALITY Index reﬂecting generality of a patent OECD




We begin our analysis investigating the main statistical properties of the en-
tire list of variables described in the previous section. It is important to note
from the beginning that the number of observations varies across variables,
depending on their nature. Speciﬁcally, ANNUAL_CITS, PAT_IN_FOR
and PATENT_WINDOW have been annually computed for each patent-
paper-pair, hence their cardinality corresponds to the rows of our unbalanced
panel (2536). Paper variables, instead, are constant during the years for
each publication, therefore we have a set 202 observations for each variable.
Lastly, Patent variables can be computed both for paired and no-paired
patents reaching a total number of 761 observations (202 + 559).
Variables of interest statistics
Table 5.1: Variables of interest statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
ANNUAL_CITS 2536 12.245 20.271 0 166
PAT_IN_FOR 2536 0.613 0.487 0 1
PATENT_WINDOW 2536 0.080 0.271 0 1
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Table 5.1 shows the main statistical properties of the ANNUAL_CITS,
PAT_IN_FOR and PATENT_WINDOW. The fact that the mean value of
PAT_IN_FOR is equal to 0.613 suggests that we are dealing with publi-
cations that have been associated (on average) with a patent for a period
slightly longer than the age they have reached at the end of 2014. Simulta-
neously, the very low mean value of PATENT_WINDOW (0.080) is simply
explained by the way we used to build this variable since we assume that
it takes value one only if the citation is made during the granting-patent
year. Lastly, the mean value of ANNUAL_CITS (12.245) is particularly
meaningful when it is compared with the median (5) and with the variance
(410.9134). The distance that occurs between the mean and the variance
tells us something about the shape of the variable's distribution, which, in
this case, is highly right-skewed. The comparison between the the mean
value and the variance, instead, is essential in order to understand the level
of dispersion, that is particularly high in our instance.
Paper variables statistics
The main statistical properties about publications characteristics are sum-
marised in Table 5.2. The ﬁst observation deserving a note regards the
boundary values assumed by the PUB_Y EAR. The oldest publication we
included in our dataset of paired patents dates back to 1986. Since we begun
our screening process for the identiﬁcation of the pairs including patents non
granted before 2004, it may appear as a contradiction to the date-matching-
requirement. However, when considering the possibility of a match not only
with the application-date, but also with a previous ﬁlling-date, the result
should not come as a surprise. On the other hand, the most recent pub-
lication year is 2010. In our scheme, it indicates a distance between the
application and the granting date very short. This situation is referred to
those patents which are recognised as highly qualitative and deserving a pri-
ority review in order to reduce the period that usually occurs before the
approval. However, extreme cases are rare in our set as we observe just 5
and 2 cases (out of 202) of papers published respectively before 1998 and
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after 2009.
Table 5.2: Paper variables statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
PUB_YEAR 2536 2002.5 3.639 1986 2010
N_OF_AUTHORS 202 9.14 5.209 2 31
N_OF_ADDRESSES 202 4.01 2.514 1 18
PUB_ADDR 202 0.94 0.237 0 1
PRIV_ADDR 202 0.28 0.454 0 1
IMP_FACT 202 10.10 11.322 1.380 55.873
The N_OF_ADDRESSES is, on average, 4. The statistics referring to
their division in PUB_ADDR and PRIV_ADDR contribute to give a clear
idea about the nature of the organizations involved in the publications. Re-
calling that the private or public characterization has been given after the
check that at lest one address is either private or public, the high mean value
of the dummy PUB_ADDRS (0.94) suggests that the almost the totality
of papers composing our set has a link with either a university or an other
public institution. This conﬁrm the importance of public institutions in the
development of knowledge in this ﬁeld. On the other hand the percentage
of private organizations involved in the publication path is, on average, very
low (28%).
Lastly, observing the properties of IMP_FACT, we found that the articles
involved in our analysis belong to a set of journals very heterogeneous in
terms of quality. This result is supported by both the high value of the
standard deviation (11.322) and by the long distance between the max and
the min values. Moreover, we can go a little further comparing the mean
value of IMP_FACT (10.1) with the mean value of annual citations received
by the papers (12.245. See Table 5.1). Recalling that the impact factor
is computed by the isi as an average of the citations yearly received by
the articles contained in a speciﬁc journal, the diﬀerence of 2.23 may be
interpreted has the sign that the publications included in our set of pairs, are
(on average) annually more cited than articles collected in the same journal.
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Patent variables statistics
In Table 5.3 we report a summary of the main statistical properties of patent
variables for the entire initial set of 761 patents, regardless of their division
in paired and no-paired.
Table 5.3: Patent variables statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
GRANT_Y EAR 761 2008 2.305 2004 2011
PATENT_SCOPE 761 3.524 1.949 1 11
FAMILY_SIZE 761 7.505 6.138 1 38
INV_TEAM_SIZE 761 3.152 1.896 1 11
BWD_CITS 761 15.763 22.447 0 113
NPL_CITS 761 33.311 30.155 0 125
N_OF_CLAIMS 761 15.538 15.914 1 190
FWD_CITS5 761 3.136 5.799 0 89
FWD_CITS7 761 4.201 7.326 0 110
GENERALITY 761 0.641 0.218 0.000 0.924
ORIGINALITY 761 0.845 0.144 0.000 0.963
Although it may be interesting to in depth discuss these characteristics
in order to have an idea about the peculiarities of the patents contained in
the technological class 435/7.23, this is not the aim of our work. Rather,
we aim at identifying diﬀerences between paired and no-paired patents
included in the class. Therefore, the next section achieves at underlying
those diﬀerences at a descriptive level.
5.1.1 A comparison between paired and no-paired patents
The variables that we intend to consider for the sake of comparison are
summarised in Tables 5.4 and 5.5, which refer to the sets of no-paired and
paired patents respectively.
In order to test the diﬀerences between the properties of the two sets,
we have to take into consideration that the variables' distributions are not
normal. As an example, Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show the density function of
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Table 5.4: Characteristics of no-paired patents
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
PATENT_SCOPE 559 3.605 2.005 1 11
BWD_CITS 559 16.446 22.444 0 113
NPL_CITS 559 32.832 30.224 0 125
N_OF_CLAIMS 559 15.570 15.309 1 148
FWD_CITS5 559 3.245 6.094 0 89
FWD_CITS7 559 4.318 7.588 0 110
GENERALITY 559 0.645 0.218 0.000 0.924
ORIGINALITY 559 0.848 0.143 0.000 0.963
Table 5.5: Characteristics of paired patents
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
PATENT_SCOPE 202 3.302 1.771 1 8
BWD_CITS 202 13.891 22.406 0 104
NPL_CITS 202 34.624 30.001 0 110
N_OF_CLAIMS 202 15.450 17.506 1 190
FWD_CITS5 202 2.837 4.903 0 30
FWD_CITS7 202 3.881 6.561 0 39
GENERALITY 202 0.627 0.219 0.000 0.873
ORIGINALITY 202 0.836 0.149 0.000 0.958
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NPL_CITS and of ORIGINALITY both in cases of no-paired and paired
patents.
Figure 5.1: NPL_CITS density for paired(red) and no-paired(black)
patents
Figure 5.2: ORIGINALITY density for paired(red) and no-
paired(black) patents
Although the shapes of the densities are very diﬀerent, it is undoubtedly
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true that in the two cases the distribution is not-normal. The non patented
citations clearly present a right-skewed distribution, the originality index,
instead, has a left-skewed distribution. The observed non regularity and non
normality impedes to use a classical t-test on mean diﬀerences in order to
compare the two sets of variables.
Therefore, we opted to perform a Mann-Whitney test on median diﬀer-
ences. In Table 5.6 we report the medians, for each indicators, from both
the no-paired and paired patents sets. Moreover, in the third column,
we indicate the p-value associated to the performed Mann-Whitney test. In
particular, the null hypothesis we want to test is that there is no diﬀerence
between the medians from the two sets.
Table 5.6: Mann-Whitney test on median diﬀerence
Statistic Median NPP Median PP M-W test
PATENT_SCOPE 3 3 (0.1209)
BWD_CITS 8 5 (0.0004)∗∗∗
NPL_CITS 22 25 (0.0274)∗
N_OF_CLAIMS 11 12 (0.9317)
FWD_CITS5 1 1 (0.9317)
FWD_CITS7 2 1 (0.0417)∗
GENERALITY 0.714323 0.7044291 (0.2349)
ORIGINALITY 0.8960 0.8292 (0.0163)∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The variables which present a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two sets
are BWD_CITS, NPL_CITS, FWD_CITS7 and ORIGINALITY . On the
other hand, PATENT_SCOPE, N_OF_CLAIMS, FWD_CITS5 and GEN-
ERALITY show not statistically diﬀerent medians in the no-paired patents
and paired patents cases.
The results of the NPL_CITS is not surprising because of the sample
construction. Both the median and the mean are higher in the paired
patents (32.8 vs. 34.6 and 22 vs.25). As already speciﬁed, NPL_CITS
are a good indicator for the contribution of public knowledge to a speciﬁc
innovation. Given the criteria that we used to establish a patent-paper-pair,
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it becomes evident that the inventors of a paired patents are also involved in
the academic world. Therefore, the fact that they have an inclination to cite
public articles should not come as a surprise. However, Branstetter (2005)
advocates that NPL_CITS are also a measurement positively related with
the quality of the patent itself.
Among the various indicators we considered, important ones for the sake
of quality are BWD_CITS, FWD_CITS5, FWD_CITS7, ORIGINALITY
and GENERALITY. From the analysis of the results we got, it seems that
their values tends to contradict the Branstetter's hypothesis, when the (very
speciﬁc and limited) patent-papers-pair analysis is carried out. In fact, mean
and median of these three indicators follow a path which goes it the opposite
direction. The highest values, indeed, are observed in case of no-paired
patents. In particular, the BWD_CITS show a diﬀerence at the highest
level of signiﬁcance in favour of the no-paired patents. Since it is a wide-
shared opinion1 that BWD_CITS are positively correlated with the degree
of novelty of the invention, we shall state that the paired patents in our
sample appear to be less novel than the no-paired ones.
When we combine information about BWD_CITS and technological classes
(IPC) together, we found out that paired patents also sin in terms of ORIG-
INALITY. Although the values of the originality index are quite high in both
cases, there is a signiﬁcant evidence that no-paired patents are more orig-
inal than the paired ones. Following the common interpretation, it means
that the latter group of observations cites document classiﬁed in a smaller
number of technological classes.
Lastly, the analysis of diﬀerences in the forward citations, suggests that,
when the basis of observation is 7 years (FWD_CITS7 ), paired patents,
plausibly assumes a lower relevance for the development of follow-on-technology,
when a comparison with the no-paired patents is done.
The totally diﬀerent path observed for NPL_CITS, on one side, and
for BWD_CITS, FWD_CITS7 and ORIGINALITY, on the other, seems
to lead to an inconsistency. However this incongruity is very likely to be
restricted at the speciﬁc case of study. In particular, the patent-paper-pair
1Verspagen (2008)
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approach itself may be the cause of it. In fact, when it is recognised that a
patent is associated with a previously published paper, the piece of knowledge
disclosed after the granting is actually already in the public domain through
publications. This may be a good explanation for the reason why we observe,
in our sets, lower level of FWD_CITS, BWD_CITS and ORIGINALITY in
case of paired patents. On the other hand, the high value of NPL_CITS is
consistent with this kind of analysis since, regardless of the period, publishers
in scientiﬁc journals keep to be willing to cite academic works even when they
becomes inventors.
Despite the potential importance of the result, it is worth noticing that
the analysis of the patent characteristics has been conducted at a descriptive
level. It would be totally misleading to generalise this conclusion at a wider
dimension, but it constitutes a good starting point for future research.
5.2 Econometric Analysis
The parameters we are going to estimate by means of NBRM are showed in
Equation 5.1
ANNUAL_CITSi,t = f(αPATENT_WINDOWi,t + βPAT_IN_FORi,t
+γN_OF_AUTHORSi + δN_OF_ADDRESSESi + ηPUB_ADDRESSi
+ζPRIV_ADDRESSi + ψIMP_FACTi; i,t)
(5.1)
In particular, we focus on α and β, which are the coeﬃcients of our ex-
planatory variables. The results of this ﬁrst regression are reported in Table
5.7. Here, we observe that, among the control variables, PRIV_ADDR and
N_OF_ADDRESSES are signiﬁcantly correlated with the number of annual
citations. Speciﬁcally, an higher number of addresses lead to an increase in
the rate of follow-on publications. On the other hand, when the nature of
addresses is private, it implies a reduction it the number of ANNUAL_CITS.
The latter observation is an interesting one. In fact, it suggests that even in
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case of public tools of disclosure (papers), the private nature of the organi-
zations involved in the publication path can reveal to be slightly damaging
for future research.
Going back to our variables of interest, we observe that PAT_IN_FOR
does not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the ANNUAL_CITS count. On contrary
PATENT_WINDOW positively aﬀect the number of citations yearly re-
ceived by the focal paper2. Both the results are in contrast with our original
expectation based on Huang's and Murray's (2009) seminal paper.
In that paper, the authors apply the patent-paper-pair approach in case
of research on human genetics. Although the set of hypotheses they aim to
test is much broader than ours, the ﬁrst assumption that is veriﬁed in the
paper is that patent grants have a strong (17%) negative impact for the rate
of annual citations. The diﬀerence between the results could be driven by
several factors. In fact, it is worth noticing that our work is only partially
comparable with Huang's and Murray's work. First of all, the abstract-
matching-requirement is much more stringent and unmistakable when it is
conducted in the genetic ﬁelds. The starting set considered by the authors,
indeed, is not a speciﬁc technological class, but all the patents disclosing a
gene sequence. The latter must be also the novelty diﬀused in the paper. It
is clear that when the innovation is directly referred to a codiﬁed information
(i.e. the gene sequence), it becomes much more identiﬁable as the possible
related infringements do. However, a part from this observation, we tried to
give a further interpretation to the obtained result which will be extensively
discussed in the next section.
5.2.1 A possible explanation
In order to understand the nature of our opposite results, we further in-
vestigate the nature of the forward citations received by the 202 paired-
publications.
Speciﬁcally, we focused on the identities of the citing papers' authors. At
2Speciﬁcally, the eﬀect is an increase of 31%. The latte is obtained exponentiating the
coeﬃcient in Table 5.7 and subtracting 1 from the result
CHAPTER 5. RESULTS 72



















Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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ﬁrst glance, we observed that a considerable share of citations had been made
by the patents' inventors. Given the hight relevance that this feature will
assume for this work, we deﬁne a new variable that has never been considered
earlier in the literature. We refer to auto-citations (AUTO_CITS) as those
ones that, when a patent-paper-pair is considered, the paper receives by the
paired patent's author.
The identiﬁcation process for the AUTO_CITS is neither automatic
nor immediate. In fact, there are no alternative ways for the analysis of the
citation path associated to each publication, if not manually matching data
from the uspto and the isi web of science. Our aim is to understand
how the auto citations behave before and after the granting in a way which
is formal as much as possible. However, to be coherent with the analytical
framework that we used so far, we should be able to identify not only the
total number of auto citations received by each paper, but also their annual
distribution. Since we are facing a total amount of citations equal to 31053
observations, it would be hard, if not impossible, to manually classify them
for authors and publication year.
Our expectation is that the the portion of AUTO_CITS is signiﬁcantly
higher after the grant, since the patent's inventors would be the only ones not
risking to incur in legal suits citing the paper contained a piece of knowledge
covered by IPR. In order to test this hypothesis, being unable to consider
the entire set of observations for the reasons explained above, we consider
a limited subset of publications. In particular, we used the R-command
sample(20) to randomly choose twenty patent-paper-pairs whose citations
have been deeply analysed. We found out that in 17 cases out of 20, the
share of annual citations post-grant is higher than the same measurement in
the pre-granting period. Speciﬁcally, it emerges that, on average:
• The percentage of auto citations in the ﬁrst period is 5%
• The percentage of auto citations in the second period is 20%
Despite the small size of the sample, the trend is clear and unambiguous.
Therefore, we include this feature in our model by approximating the diﬀer-
ence in the number of AUTO_CITS pre and post grant with a value of 15%.
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Moreover, given the signiﬁcant diﬀerence inside the sample, we extended this
result to the entire set of patent-paper-pairs and we built an other variable
(NET_CITS) which will be our new dependant variable and is deﬁned as
follows:
NET_CITSi,t =
(1− p¯)ANNUAL_CITSi,t if PAT_IN_FORi,t = 0(1− P¯ )ANNUAL_CITSi,t if PAT_IN_FORi,t = 1
Where:
p¯ is a constant approximating the mean value of the pre-grant AUTO_CITS
P¯ is a constant approximating the mean value of the post-grantAUTO_CITS
In our case, p¯ and P¯ assume values 0.05 and 0.15 respectively. There-
fore, by applying the deﬁnition of NET_CITS, we proceed to re-estimate
model 5.1 considering the estimated number of net citations (instead of AN-
NUAL_CITS ) as dependent variable (See equation 5.2).
NET_CITSi,t = f(αPATENT_WINDOWi,t + βPAT_IN_FORi,t
+γN_OF_AUTHORSi + δN_OF_ADDRESSESi + ηPUB_ADDRESSi
+ζPRIV_ADDRESSi + ψIMP_FACTi; i,t)
(5.2)
The estimated coeﬃcients for our two explanatory variables are shown
in Table 5.8. Here, in the post-grant period the expected net annual rate
of forward citations is negative at the highest level of signiﬁcance with a
decline of 11.67 %3. However, the PATENT_WINDOW coeﬃcient keep
being positive indicating an increase of net citations during the granting year.
Although our original work did not aim to consider the separate eﬀect
3In order to interpret the coeﬃcients as the percent change of the dependant variable
corresponding to a unit change of the dependant variable, it has to be exponentiated the
factor directly obtained from the negative binomial regression and, then, it has to be
deducted 1. Therefore, the explicit calculation we performed to get the measurement of
the decline are exp(−0.12414)− 1 = −0.1167
CHAPTER 5. RESULTS 75
of granting on the patent's owners and on third parties, the ﬁrst wave of
(unexpected)4 results gave us the right spark to deeper investigate which
are the implications of IPR regimes in the ﬁeld of medical research. What
emerges from our analysis is that, even though the total amount of follow-on
public knowledge (measured by means of forward ANNUAL_CITS) does
not decline after the grant, it has an important eﬀects on third parties. In
fact, their attitude to cite the focal paper is relatively lower in the second
period when they incur the risk of legal suits. On the contrary, the patent's
authors, are the only ones free to keep citing the article with no-infringement-
risks. Therefore, we argue that the eﬀect of granting is on the concentration
of knowledge in the hands of few actors, rather than on its absolute quantity.









Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Furthermore, we observe that the decline in the rate of annual citations
does not occur in the patent granting year. It may be well explained if we
consider that the grant comes to third parties as a surprise. Therefore, the
impact of a shift in the institutional environment cannot be immediately
evident. On the contrary, this lag strengthens our hypothesis of knowledge
concentration. The fact that in the following years the drop of net citations
4Being our work based on the patent-paper-pair approach, we initially expected to ﬁnd
results coherent with other studies conducted using the same methodology, i.e. a decline
in the number ANNUAL_CITS associated with the practice of granting.
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clearly manifests, might be the real consequence for legal costs ascribed to
third parties that have cited the focal paper during the patent grant year.
Obviously, this is just an hypothesis that should be veriﬁed using data refer-
ring to infringement costs.
The last step of our econometric work, consists of including in the model
some patents characteristics in order to underline their interaction with the
eﬀect of PAT_IN_FOR on the NET_CITS annual trend. In particu-
lar, we analysed the nature and the intensity of the possible impacts that
PATENT_SCOPE, FAMILY_SIZE, N_OF_CLAIMS and
INV_TIME_SIZE separately have on the measurement of the decline in
NET_CITS during the after-grant years. However, the ﬁrst three variables
seem not to play any signiﬁcant role on this matter5.











Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
On the contrary, we found an interesting result when we include the
inventive team size. In this case, the decline of net forward citation in the
second period amounts to 14.3% (See Table 5.9 ), which means an extra
5The variation of the coeﬃcient of PAT_IN_FOR never exceeds the |0.01%| when
one these variable is added to our general model (equation 5.2)
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drop of 2.6%. It is worth noticing that this result is a further validation of
our concentration hypothesis. The inventive team size, indeed, expresses the
number of patent's inventors; the higher it is, the higher the probability of
observing a reduction in the rate of net forward citations becomes.
Conclusions
The aim of this work was to investigate the eﬀects that the practice of grant-
ing patents at the highest level of medical research has on the follow-on public
knowledge. In fact, the growing number of patents referring to genetic knowl-
edge contributes to fuel the debate over the role of IPR regimes as a policy
either able to spur innovation or responsible to damage technical progress.
A number of scholars (Orsi and Coriat, 2005) have considered single case
studies showing some evidences about the negative eﬀects of gene patenting
for the long run supply of public knowledge. The Myriad genetics case, ended
with the invalidation of two genes referring to ovarian cancer, is exemplar in
this sense.
In order to expand the same kind of analysis at a broader level- not focus-
ing on speciﬁc cases- we adopted a patent-paper-pair identiﬁcation approach.
Thanks to it, we were able to concretely identify pieces of knowledge disclosed
by both private and public tools of disclosure. In the speciﬁc case of research
on cancer, we found that using the hybrid instrument of patent-paper-pair as
a tool of disclosure, is far from being an rare practice. In fact, 27% of patents
of our original set are undoubtedly associated with a paper.
Previous studies applying the same methodology are mostly due to Mur-
ray's work (See Murray (2002) and Huang and Murray (2009)) that we used
as a benchmark for our analysis. However, diﬀerently from the author, we
chose to study the IPRs implications when a speciﬁc therapeutic area (re-
search on cancer) is taken into consideration.
Contrary to our original expectation we found out that the eﬀect of patent
granting is on the diﬀerent types of citing authors, rather than on the amount
of follow-on public knowledge. In other words, granting a patent on a piece
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of knowledge already available in the public domain does not have an impact
on the total number of forward citations received by the paper. However,
patents' inventors and third parties show diﬀerent citing behaviours before
and after the grant. In fact, considering the number of net citations (i.e.
those ones received by third parties) we registered an expected decline in
citations equal to 11.67% after the patent granting.
Although this result has been obtained considering only a subset of patents
included in our sample, it ﬁnds a convincing validation when other two as-
pects are considered. Firstly, we observed that the decline in net citations
is positively correlated with the number of patent's inventors. Secondly, the
drop in the rate of net citations is not observed during the grant year, but
clearly manifests in the following period. It may reasonably occur because
the patent grant comes as a surprise for third parties who would keep citing
the paper without the awareness of the infringement. Therefore, we claim
that an analysis of the infringement costs ascribed to third parties, is a good
starting point for future research agenda.
Moreover, our ﬁndings contribute to reveal some important diﬀerences
between paired and unpaired patents. Speciﬁcally, we found that, when in-
tellectual property rights are granted on pieces of knowledge already publicly
disclosed, the resulting patents appear to be less original and less cited than
the other (unpaired) patents contained in the same technological class. On
the contrary, we observed that papers considered in our sample of pairs, are,
on average, more cited than other papers published by the same journal.
We claim that a further investigation about this controversial evidence is
necessary for a deeper comprehension of the role played by private tools of
disclosure in case of basic medical research.
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